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Lawrence B. Solum∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
In Pseudo-Contract and Shared Meaning Analysis,1 Professors 
Robin Bradley Kar and Margaret Jane Radin develop an important  
theory of the nature of contract that draws on Paul Grice’s influential 
theory of meaning.2  That theory has significant implications for  
contract doctrine, especially for questions about the enforceability of so-
called “contracts of adhesion” in particular and for “boilerplate” in gen-
eral.  But at the most fundamental level, Kar and Radin’s work is about 
the nature of contractual communication.  They answer the question: 
How do contracts mean?  Their answer proposes a theoretical structure, 
which they name “Shared Meaning Analysis.”3  This Response focuses 
on “contractual communication”4: it interrogates the philosophical and  
linguistic presuppositions of Shared Meaning Analysis and offers, in  
embryonic form, a rival view. 
Shared Meaning Analysis begins with the idea that “meaning” can 
be shared.  In the particular context of contractual communication, 
meaning is something that can be shared by the parties to a contract, 
but the idea of shared meaning is quite general: when a speaker success-
fully conveys communicated content to a listener, meaning is shared.  
Shared meaning arises in mundane contexts, like a conversation about 
the weather, and in legal contexts, including communication via  
constitutions, statutes, rules, regulations, treaties, judicial opinions, 
trusts, wills, and contracts. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 † Responding to Robin Bradley Kar & Margaret Jane Radin, Pseudo-Contract and Shared 
Meaning Analysis, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1135 (2019). 
 ∗ Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  This Response 
is dedicated to Peter Tiersma, my former colleague who passed from this earth long before his time.  
On many of the topics discussed in this Response, Peter got there first.  See A Tribute to Peter M. 
Tiersma, LOYOLA L. SCH., https://petertiersma.lls.edu [https://perma.cc/K3UR-4QQR].  I am grate-
ful to Brian Bix, Enrique Guerra-Pujol, Mitu Gulati, Tal Kastner, Dennis Patterson, Brian Slocum, 
and the editors of the Harvard Law Review for many helpful comments, criticisms, and suggestions. 
 1 Robin Bradley Kar & Margaret Jane Radin, Pseudo-Contract and Shared Meaning Analysis, 
132 HARV. L. REV. 1135 (2019). 
 2 Id. at 1144–56.  See generally PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS (1989) (col-
lecting many of Grice’s most important papers on the philosophy of language). 
 3 Kar & Radin, supra note 1, at 1142–43.  The capitalization of “Shared Meaning Analysis” 
conveys that I am using this phrase as a proper name for Kar and Radin’s theory.  I use this same 
convention to name other theoretical positions — for example “Public Meaning Originalism” — in 
the discussion that follows. 
 4 The idea of a theory of contractual communication is sometimes raised by legal scholars.  See, 
e.g., Peter Goodrich, Habermas and the Postal Rule, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1457, 1467 (1996) (raising 
the possibility of “a general theory of contractual communication”). 
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Take the constitutional context as an example.  When a constitu-
tional provision is drafted (for example, by Gouverneur Morris at the 
Philadelphia Convention), and the drafter’s communicative intentions 
are successfully conveyed to the other Framers, the members of the rat-
ifying conventions, the public at large, and the officials who implement 
the constitutional text, meaning is shared.5  The meaning identified by 
constitutional theorists as “original public meaning” is a kind of shared 
meaning.6  Similarly, if the drafters of a statute successfully convey the 
same “plain meaning” (communicative content) to the relevant intended 
readerships (including judges, lawyers, and those subject to the statute’s 
provisions), then the text of the statute will have a plain meaning. 
But just as communication can succeed in the creation of shared 
meaning, it can also fail.  Communication can misfire for a host of rea-
sons.  One such reason is illustrated by the existence of what are called 
“terms of art” or “technical language.”  Later in this Response, for in-
stance, I will use terms like “implicature,” “impliciture,” and “presuppo-
sition.”  The first two of these terms are not used in ordinary English, 
but they do have precise meanings in the philosophy of language and 
theoretical linguistics.  The third term, “presupposition,” does have an 
ordinary meaning, but it has a more precise meaning when it is used by 
professional philosophers and scholars of linguistics.  When the author 
of a text uses a technical term, but the reader doesn’t know what it 
means, then communication fails in a way that the reader can recognize.  
But when an author uses a word or phrase in a technical sense and the 
reader understands that term in its ordinary sense, communication may 
fail without the reader’s knowledge.  In either case, we can say that the 
communication “misfires.”  And “misfire” is itself a technical term used 
to describe such failures of communication. 
There are numerous other reasons that the communicative content 
of a text can fail to produce shared meaning.  When installing software 
downloaded from the Internet, we are frequently asked to click a link 
that says something like “I agree” while given the option to click another 
link that takes one to the full text of the software license.  If we fail to 
click through, read, and comprehend the text of the agreement, clicking 
the “I agree” link does not create shared meaning.  In the case of such 
clickwrap agreements, it seems likely that fully shared meaning is very 
rare indeed. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 5 Here is Kar and Radin’s initial formulation of their notion of shared meaning: “We . . . define 
the ‘shared meaning’ of a contract as the meaning parties produce and agree to during contract 
formation that is most consistent with the presupposition that both were using language coopera-
tively to form a contract.”  Kar & Radin, supra note 1, at 1143. 
 6 Original public meaning is actually shared meaning only if it is successfully communicated.  
If constitutional communication misfires, then the meaning intended by the drafter of a constitu-
tional provision can diverge from the meaning grasped by the public. 
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Communication can also fail in another way.  An officer can order a 
subordinate into battle and be disobeyed.  I can request extra salsa at a 
restaurant, but the wait staff might ignore my request.  A contracting 
party can make an offer that is rejected.  In cases like these, a “speech 
act” (more on this concept below7) fails to gain what we can call “up-
take.”  This is distinct from a failure of understanding: misunderstand-
ing an order is one thing, but disobedience is quite another.  The word 
“uptake” refers to the success or failure of a speech act: when a speech 
act succeeds, it gets “uptake.” 
Some communication is cooperative.  We might say that shared 
meaning is the goal of cooperative communication.  Some communica-
tion is noncooperative or “strategic.”  For example, the drafter of legal 
text (such as, a constitutional provision, statute, treaty, or contract) 
might want to communicate different messages to different readers.  
Thus, a clever drafter might deliberately try to write a statute that con-
veys one message when it is read by staffers and legislators but can 
convey a different message when it is read by judges and lawyers in the 
adjudicative process.  This kind of strategic communication involves 
“speaking out of both sides of your mouth,” deliberately creating mean-
ings that are not shared by all of the intended readers of the text.  I will 
use the phrase “unshared meaning” to refer to cases in which the content 
communicated by a legal text is not shared by those who are intended 
to read or to be affected by the text.8 
In this Response, I will investigate the foundations of both shared 
and unshared meaning in legal communication.  Part I takes a step back 
from contractual communication and offers a preliminary sketch of a 
general model of legal communication; the sketch draws on speech act 
theory and the work of Paul Grice, extending and modifying many of 
the insights developed by Kar and Radin.  Part II turns to contractual 
communication, differentiating distinct “situations of contractual com-
munication” and interrogating Kar and Radin’s Shared Meaning  
Analysis.  Part III interrogates Kar and Radin’s distinction between 
“contract” and “pseudo-contract.”  The conclusion of the Response 
briefly reflects on the significance of Kar and Radin’s project. 
I.  A PRELIMINARY SKETCH OF A GENERAL MODEL  
OF LEGAL COMMUNICATION 
Before we plunge into Kar and Radin’s account of contractual com-
munication, let us take a step back to consider legal communication 
more generally in two steps.  The first step lays out some basic ideas 
about communication in general.  The second step examines some of the 
ways in which legal communication involves special considerations. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 7 See infra section I.A.4, pp. 32–34. 
 8 See infra section I.B.3(c), pp. 43–45. 
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A.  Step One: Communication in General 
Before we can understand legal communication, we need some basic 
tools for understanding communication in general.  Like Kar and Radin, 
I will begin with the powerful and influential work of Paul Grice and 
then consider the role of semantics and pragmatics before turning to 
Grice’s famous maxims. 
1.  The Neo-Gricean Model of Communication. — The core of Grice’s 
account of meaning is the idea of speaker’s meaning.  Although Kar and 
Radin focus on Grice’s maxims of conversation, the maxims are not the 
key to understanding Grice’s view.  Instead, Grice’s most fundamental 
idea involves what we can call communicative intentions.  The 
speaker’s meaning of an utterance is the meaning that the speaker in-
tends to convey to the listener via the listener’s recognition of the 
speaker’s communicative intentions. 
Notice that Grice’s model involves a “reflexive intention.”  As  
Professors Kent Bach and Robert Harnish put it, “a reflexive intention 
is an intention that is intended to be recognized as intended to be recog-
nized.”9  Authors intend for their intentions to be recognized: the  
author’s meaning of a text is this intended meaning. 
As Kar and Radin observe, Grice distinguishes speaker’s meaning 
from sentence meaning.10  The sentence meaning of an utterance or text 
is very similar to the idea of “literal meaning” that is more familiar to 
lawyers.  Sentence meaning is acontextual; it is the meaning of the words 
independent of the context of utterance.  Sentence meaning is possible 
because words and phrases have conventional semantic meanings and 
because of the conventions of syntax that we sometimes call “rules of 
grammar and punctuation.” 
Before we go any further, we should note that the word “meaning” 
is ambiguous.11  When we talk about the “meaning” of a legally  
operative text, we might be referring to the effect of the text, the purpose 
for which the text was written, or the content communicated by the 
contextualized linguistic meaning of the text — and there are other 
meanings of “meaning.”  In the discussion that follows, the word “mean-
ing” and the expression “shared meaning” represent the communicative 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 9 KENT BACH & ROBERT M. HARNISH, LINGUISTIC COMMUNICATION AND SPEECH 
ACTS, at xiv–xv (1979); see also François Recanati, On Defining Communicative Intentions, 1 
MIND & LANGUAGE 213, 214–15 (1986) (quoting BACH & HARNISH, supra, at xiv–xv). 
 10 Kar & Radin, supra note 1, at 1148.  
 11 On the ambiguity of meaning, see C.K. OGDEN & I.A. RICHARDS, THE MEANING OF 
MEANING 186–87 (8th ed. 1946) (exploring different senses of “meaning”); Michael L. Geis, On 
Meaning: The Meaning of Meaning in the Law, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1125, 1125–26 (1995) (observing 
that the Supreme Court uses the words “mean” and “meaning” in multiple ways); A.P. Martinich, 
Four Senses of “Meaning” in the History of Ideas: Quentin Skinner’s Theory of Historical  
Interpretation, 3 J. PHIL. HIST. 225, 226 (2009) (“Equivocating on the word ‘meaning’ is easy both 
because that word has several related senses and because understanding the meaning of a text in 
one of these senses is crucial to understanding its meaning in another sense.”); Lawrence B. Solum, 
Intellectual History as Constitutional Theory, 101 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1115–16 (2015). 
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content produced by an utterance or writing in context.  This observa-
tion brings us to our next topic, the distinction between semantics and 
pragmatics. 
2.  Semantics and Pragmatics. — What are the mechanisms of com-
munication?  How do speakers and authors successfully convey their 
communicative intentions to listeners and readers?  One way to answer 
these questions begins with the distinction between “semantics” and 
“pragmatics.”  For readers unfamiliar with the philosophy of language 
and theoretical linguistics, a word of caution: the word “pragmatics” in 
the context of the semantics-pragmatics distinction has very little con-
nection to the words “pragmatic” and “pragmatism” as they are used in 
legal theory. 
The distinction between semantics and pragmatics is contested in the 
philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics, but for our purposes, 
the following discussion by Bach will suffice to provide a working vo-
cabulary: “[S]emantic information pertains to linguistic expressions . . . 
whereas pragmatic information pertains to utterances and facts  
surrounding them.  Semantic information about sentences is part of sen-
tence grammar, and it includes information about expressions whose 
meanings are relevant to use rather than to truth conditions.”12 
Bach continues: 
  Pragmatic information concerns facts relevant to making sense of a 
speaker’s utterance of a sentence (or other expression).  The hearer thereby 
seeks to identify the speaker’s intention in making the utterance.  In effect 
the hearer seeks to explain the fact that the speaker said what he said, in 
the way he said it.  Because the intention is communicative, the hearer’s 
task of identifying it is driven partly by the assumption that the speaker 
intends him to do this.  The speaker succeeds in communicating if the hearer 
identifies his intention in this way, for communicative intentions are inten-
tions whose “fulfillment consists in their recognition.”  Pragmatics is con-
cerned with whatever information is relevant, over and above the linguistic 
properties of a sentence, to understanding its utterance.13 
Returning to Grice’s distinction between “speaker’s meaning” and 
“sentence meaning,” we can now say that the sentence meaning of an 
utterance or text is its “semantic meaning,” whereas the speaker’s mean-
ing of an utterance includes the pragmatic dimension of meaning.   
Semantic meaning is acontextual; pragmatics takes context into account. 
(a)  The Mechanisms of Semantics: Conventional Semantic Mean-
ings and Syntax. — How is literal meaning conveyed?  What produces 
the semantic content of an utterance or writing?  A basic answer to these 
questions begins with the idea that words and phrases have conven-
tional semantic meanings, produced by patterns of usage.  Words and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 12 Kent Bach, The Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction: What It Is and Why It Matters, S.F. ST. 
U., http://userwww.sfsu.edu/kbach/spd.htm [https://perma.cc/E8NZ-5VFC]. 
 13 Id. (citation omitted).  
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phrases are combined into large units, sentences, by syntax, roughly the 
regularities of grammar and punctuation that we sometimes call “rules.” 
The line between semantics and pragmatics can be drawn in various 
ways.  One question concerns the role of contextual disambiguation.  A 
sentence like “The bank is closed.” might refer to a financial institution 
or a public park adjoining a river.  For our purposes, it doesn’t matter 
whether the semantic content of such a sentence is considered ambigu-
ous or if we use the phrase “semantic content” to refer to the contextually 
disambiguated meaning.  Whether we put contextual disambiguation on 
the semantic or the pragmatic side of the ledger, the full communicative 
content includes pragmatics — and it is the full communicative content 
that is important for the purposes of interpreting legal texts. 
There are many different types of communicative situations involv-
ing linguistic exchanges: ordinary conversations about the weather, oral 
exchanges involving offers and acceptances, drafting statutes, drafting 
contracts, and so forth.  When we use language to communicate, we 
take advantage of the conventional semantic meanings of words and 
phrases and the conventions of grammar and punctuations.  In other 
words, we can use literal meaning to communicate.  But literal meaning 
is not the only tool.  In ordinary communication, we are not in the situ-
ation of someone who puts a message in a bottle, where the only context 
available to an unknown future reader is the fact that the words were 
found written on a scrap of paper and placed by someone in a bottle 
that was tossed in the sea.  Ordinary communication almost always in-
volves a context that can enrich the meaning of what we say or write.  
This is the domain of pragmatics. 
(b)  The Mechanisms of Pragmatics. — How do we take advantage 
of context to communicate content that is richer than literal meaning?  
We have already discussed contextual disambiguation.  If I write a con-
tract using the word “bank,” it is quite likely that I dispense with explicit 
disambiguation and rely on context to convey which sense of “bank” is 
intended.  But context can operate in other ways to enrich the commu-
nicative content of a text or utterance.  The phrase “pragmatic enrich-
ment” is used to refer to this phenomenon, although we might use  
“contextual enrichment” to avoid the associations that “pragmatic” has 
for lawyers and legal theorists.14 
Here are four illustrative forms of contextual enrichment, briefly  
described and illustrated by example15: 
Implicature: The word “implicature” was coined by Grice to name 
the way in which an utterance can convey communicative content that 
is different from its semantic content.16  The classic example is a letter 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 14 See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269, 288 (2017). 
 15 See id. at 288–91.  
 16 See Wayne Davis, Implicature, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Sept. 6, 2019), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/implicature [https://perma.cc/4D6S-M27Y].  
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of recommendation.  Suppose that I write a letter for a student applying 
for a Supreme Court clerkship.  The letter reads as follows: “I recom-
mend Alice.  They were always on time to class and their attendance 
record was perfect.”  Literally, the letter communicates a recommenda-
tion supported by information about punctuality and attendance.  But 
in the context, this letter is actually a warning and not a recommenda-
tion at all.  If the best that can be said about Alice is that they were on 
time and did not miss class, the implicature is that Alice is not suitable 
for the position of judicial clerk. 
Impliciture: Impliciture involves situations in which what is said im-
plicitly includes something else that is closely related.17  For example, if 
I say “Jack and Jill are married,” this frequently communicates some 
additional information, which could have been stated explicitly as fol-
lows: “Jack and Jill are married [to each other].”  Article I, Section 9 of 
the Constitution explicitly states, “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto 
Law shall be passed,” with [by Congress] as an impliciture.18 
Presupposition: Presupposition involves an unstated assumption that 
is conveyed by what is said.19  If I say, “Cass is no longer the head of 
OIRA,” I also communicate that Cass was once the head of OIRA.   
Likewise, if I say, “Adrian is now a Catholic,” I communicate that 
Adrian at one time was not a Catholic.20  The constitutional text may 
have a variety of presuppositions.  Famously, the Ninth Amendment 
may presuppose the existence of “other” rights “retained by the People,” 
even though it does not say this explicitly.21 
Modulation: The intuitive idea is that a conventional semantic 
meaning can be adjusted or modulated to fit the context — essentially 
a new meaning is created (sometimes on the spot) so that an old word is 
used in a new way.22  In the law, modulation can create a new technical 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 17 Kent Bach, Conversational Impliciture, 9 MIND & LANGUAGE 124, 126 (1994). 
 18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
 19 See, e.g., Philippe Schlenker, Be Articulate: A Pragmatic Theory of Presupposition  
Projection, 34 THEORETICAL LINGUISTICS 157, 161 (2008); Bas C. van Fraassen, Presupposition, 
Implication, and Self-Reference, 65 J. PHIL. 136, 137–39 (1968); David I. Beaver & Bart Geurts, 
Presupposition, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Apr. 1, 2011), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ 
presupposition [https://perma.cc/YX3F-QFXX]. 
 20 Philosophers of language distinguish between “conversational presuppositions” (also called 
“speaker presuppositions” or “pragmatic presuppositions”) and “conventional presuppositions” (or 
“semantic presuppositions”) that are triggered by particular words or phrases (“no longer” in the 
first example above).  See Beaver & Geurts, supra note 19.  For our purposes, we can put these 
technicalities to the side.  
 21 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX; Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitu-
tion, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1935, 1958–61. 
 22 François Recanati explains modulation as follows: 
Sense modulation is essential to speech, because we use a (more or less) fixed stock of 
lexemes to talk about an indefinite variety of things, situations and experiences.  Through 
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meaning for a word that also has an ordinary sense.  For example, the 
Recess Appointments Clause uses the word “recess,” the literal meaning 
of which could refer to any break in the business of the Senate.23  In 
context, “recess” may be limited to the break between sessions of the 
Senate.24  If so, then the constitutional meaning of “recess” in the clause 
is a modulation of the conventional semantic meaning of the word. 
Finally, there is a residual category of “free enrichments” that do not 
fit into any of these categories.25  For present purposes, the category of 
free enrichment and any other forms of pragmatic enrichment are set 
aside. 
Some legal texts aim to be more explicit than do face-to-face oral 
conversations: contracts between sophisticated business entities that 
govern complex construction projects may be an example.  Some legally 
operative utterances are face-to-face oral conversations; the dance of of-
fer and acceptance in a simple contract between a homeowner and a 
handyman could illustrate this situation.  But whether a legal commu-
nication is oral or written, meaning is a product of both semantics and 
pragmatics.  Literal meaning, contextual disambiguation, and pragmatic 
enrichment all play a role in conveying communicative intentions and 
hence in the creation of shared meaning. 
3.  The Role of the Gricean Maxims and Alternatives Thereto. — 
Grice’s maxims of conversation play a central role in Kar and Radin’s 
account of shared meaning.  The maxims are rules of thumb that enable 
readers and listeners to grasp the author or speaker’s communicative 
intentions.  Here is the list of maxims, formulated concisely: 
The maxim of quantity, provide as much information as needed but 
no more.26 
The maxim of quality, be sincere.27 
The maxim of relation, be relevant.28 
The maxim of manner, be clear and avoid obscurity.29 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
the interaction between the context-independent meanings of our words and the particu-
lars of the situation talked about, contextualized, modulated senses emerge, appropriate 
to the situation at hand. 
FRANÇOIS RECANATI, LITERAL MEANING 131 (2004) (footnote omitted). 
 23 See NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828), 
http://webstersdictionary1828.com/Dictionary/recess [https://perma.cc/3EZ4-M6N3] (defining “re-
cess” as “[r]emission or suspension of business or procedure; as, the house of representatives had a 
recess of half an hour”). 
 24 See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 575 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“A sensible interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause should start by recognizing that the 
Clause uses the term ‘Recess’ in contradistinction to the term ‘Session.’”). 
 25 NICHOLAS ALLOTT, KEY TERMS IN PRAGMATICS 80 (2010). 
 26 GRICE, supra note 2, at 26. 
 27 Id. at 27. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
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Grice’s maxims are not like the rules of chess.  In chess a move con-
trary to the rules does not count or results in a penalty such as forfeiture, 
but in conversation, a certain amount of redundancy, insincerity, irrele-
vance, and obscurity is par for the course.  Grice’s maxims are rules of 
thumb — generalizations that help us grasp communicative intentions 
most of the time, in most communicative situations, for most speakers. 
Perhaps it is unwise to use President Trump as an example, but it 
seems likely that the President frequently communicates in ways that 
do not conform to the Gricean maxims, adding extraneous comments 
that are duplicative, including statements not supported by evidence, 
straying from the topic, and speaking in ways that are disorderly, ob-
scure, and ambiguous.  Nonetheless, President Trump does communi-
cate.  Violating the maxims of conversation might lead to misinterpre-
tation, but ordinarily, an expression that includes redundancy, 
insincerity, or irrelevancy will be comprehensible.  Obscurity is different; 
if an expression is sufficiently obscure or unclear, it may be  
incomprehensible. 
In many cases, it is obvious that slavish adherence to the maxims 
would result in misunderstanding.  If the maxims were to be understood 
as binding rules, the outcome would frequently be misinterpretation.  
The immediately prior two sentences are substantially redundant, vio-
lating the maxim of quantity: if one tried to assign them conceptually 
distinct meanings, the result would be misinterpretation. 
Contracts are frequently drafted in a way that includes deliberate 
redundancy — sometimes to avoid misunderstanding,30 but other times 
as a result of somewhat mindless combination and copying of prior  
contracts dealing with the same type of transaction.31  This is not to say 
that the maxim of quantity does not have a legal analogue: the antire-
dundancy canon is cited in contract cases and elsewhere.32  But in the 
law as in human communication generally, redundancy may serve  
important functions.33  And redundancy may exist even when it serves 
no function at all, but is simply the result of an oversight or error. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 30 See John M. Golden, Redundancy: When Law Repeats Itself, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629, 631–32, 
645 (2016) (“[Generally,] attention to the actual results of legal drafting and the motivations of legal 
drafters suggests that drafters of legal documents ranging from statutes to contracts pay no more 
than limited heed, if any, to concerns with avoiding redundancy.”  Id. at 631–32.). 
 31 See Lori D. Johnson, Say the Magic Word: A Rhetorical Analysis of Contract Drafting 
Choices, 65 SYRACUSE L. REV. 451, 461–62 (2015) (observing that contract drafters may uncriti-
cally repeat language from old contracts because they are unsure of its meaning). 
 32 See Golden, supra note 30, at 655–56. 
 33 See Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 1105, 1157, 1161 (2003) (“Redundancy in legal communication is valued because of the large 
number of potentially interfering messages being sent.  To this one can add that a more heteroge-
neous audience is likely to find redundancy helpful in processing a message.”  Id. at 1157 (footnote 
omitted).).  
  
32 HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 133:23 
The maxims are formulated for the purpose of describing coopera-
tive communication, but in legal contexts, including contractual  
communication, this assumption does not always hold.  We need to dif-
ferentiate between strategic and cooperative legal communication — a 
topic that is explored below.34  Moreover, the maxims are controversial 
in the philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics.  For example, 
what is called “relevance theory” replaces the maxims with a generalized 
principle of efficiency.35 
Grice’s maxims point to important features of communications, but 
the meaning of an utterance or text is not determined by the maxims.  
Communicative intentions can be successfully communicated without 
adherence to the maxims, and some communication occurs in contexts 
in which the assumption that communication is cooperative does not 
hold.  Understanding a speaker or author requires that we grasp their 
communicative intention and the maxims are means to that end — tools 
or rules of thumbs that do not play a constitutive role in communication. 
4.  Speech Act Theory. — In How to Do Things with Words,36 the 
philosopher J.L. Austin developed the notion of a “speech act.”37   
Professor Mitchell Green provides the following definition: “[S]peech 
acts are those acts that can (though need not) be performed by saying 
that one is doing so.”38  There are many things that one can do with 
words, including promising, apologizing, ordering, threatening, and 
countless others.39  Some speech acts involve the law.  By saying  
something or writing something, a speaker can do something with legal 
effect.  Examples of “legal speech acts”40 include placing someone under 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 34 See infra section I.B.3(c), pp. 43–45. 
 35 See Davis, supra note 16 (“Neo-Gricean theories modify Grice’s principles to some extent, and 
Relevance theories replace them with a principle of communicative efficiency.”); see also Deirdre 
Wilson & Dan Sperber, Relevance Theory, in HANDBOOK OF PRAGMATICS 607 (Laurence R. 
Horn & Gregory Ward eds., 2004). 
 36 J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson & Marina Sbisà eds., 2d 
ed. 1975) [hereinafter AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS]. 
 37 See generally id.; J.L. AUSTIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS (J.O. Urmson & G.J. Warnock eds., 
3d ed. 1979); G.J. WARNOCK, J.L. AUSTIN (1989).  Many other theorists have contributed to speech 
act theory.  See generally NEW WORK ON SPEECH ACTS (Daniel Fogal, Daniel W. Harris & Matt 
Moss eds., 2018); JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LANGUAGE (1969); SPEECH ACT THEORY AND PRAGMATICS (John R. Searle, Ferenc Kiefer & 
Manfred Bierwisch eds., 1980); John R. Searle, How Performatives Work, 12 LINGUISTICS & PHIL. 
535 (1989).  
 38 Mitchell Green, Speech Acts: Content, Force, and How Saying Can Make It So, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct. 2, 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/speech-acts/#Con-
ForHowSayMakItSo [https://perma.cc/4NTF-ECSH]. 
 39 See id. 
 40 See generally, e.g., MARIANNE CONSTABLE, OUR WORD IS OUR BOND: HOW LEGAL 
SPEECH ACTS (2014); DENNIS KURZON, IT IS HEREBY PERFORMED . . . : EXPLORATIONS IN 
LEGAL SPEECH ACTS (1986); Paul Amselek, Philosophy of Law and the Theory of Speech Acts, 1 
RATIO JURIS 187 (1988). 
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arrest, marrying persons to each other, testifying in court, and promul-
gating an executive order.41  Contracting involves a variety of speech 
acts, importantly including offering and accepting — and in the case of 
written contracts, affixing a signature to a written agreement.42 
Austin developed a technical vocabulary for analyzing speech acts, 
distinguishing between “locution,” “illocution,” and “perlocution” as  
follows: 
Locutionary act: the uttering of a meaningful sentence.43  Example: 
Ben says, “I will fix the wall.”  The locutionary act is Ben’s utterance of 
the sentence. 
Illocutionary force: the speech act that is performed via the utter-
ance.44  Example: Ben says, “I will fix the wall” and thereby promises 
to fix the wall.  The illocutionary force is promising — a type of speech 
act. 
Perlocutionary effect: the effect produced by the speech act.  Exam-
ple: Ben says, “I will fix the wall,” thereby promising to do so, and this 
promise has the effect of inducing Alice to rely on Ben’s promise.45  The 
perlocutionary effect is the reliance by Alice induced by the promise.46 
In the discussion that follows, I will emphasize the idea that the  
content of an utterance can be distinguished from its force.  The content 
of a locution is its “meaning,” very roughly the disambiguated semantic 
content of the utterance.47  The illocutionary force of a speech act is 
distinct from its content.  The force of an utterance that makes a promise 
is promising.  The force of an utterance that pronounces two persons to 
be married is marrying.  The force of an utterance that places someone 
under arrest is arresting.48 
This next bit is very important.  If you are not already familiar with 
speech act theory, I urge you to pay close attention.  Perhaps you should 
read this paragraph twice.  The very same utterance (the same string of 
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 41 Daniel W. Harris, Daniel Fogal & Matt Moss, Speech Acts: The Contemporary Theoretical 
Landscape, in NEW WORK ON SPEECH ACTS, supra note 37, at 1, 1.  
 42 Sanford Schane, Contract Formation as a Speech Act, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
LANGUAGE AND LAW 100, 105–08 (Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan eds., 2012); Peter 
Meijes Tiersma, The Language of Offer and Acceptance: Speech Acts and the Question of Intent, 74 
CALIF. L. REV. 189, 189, 206 (1986). 
 43 AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS, supra note 36, at 94. 
 44 See id. at 98–100. 
 45 See id. at 101. 
 46 See id.  The following formulation is useful: “In singling out illocutionary acts for theoretical 
attention, Austin distinguished them from locutionary acts, which are mere utterances of meaning-
ful expressions, and perlocutionary acts, which are acts of producing effects that are causally  
downstream from illocutionary acts.”  Harris, Fogal & Moss, supra note 41, at 1. 
 47 The full content of an utterance in context may include pragmatic enrichments, content that 
is added by the context in which the utterance occurs.  See Solum, supra note 14, at 273. 
 48 See Harris, Fogal & Moss, supra note 41, at 22. 
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words) can have different illocutionary forces in different contexts.  
Thus, “I will fix the wall” can be a prediction or a promise, depending 
on the context of utterance49: 
Example 1: Alice, “What do you think you will do tomorrow?”  Ben, 
“I will fix the wall.” 
Example 2: Alice, “Do you promise to fix the wall?”  Ben, “I will fix 
the wall.” 
In Example 1, the utterance “I will fix the wall” expresses Ben’s be-
lief that fixing the wall will be his primary activity on the next day: the 
force of the utterance is assertion.  In Example 2, the utterance “I will 
fix the wall” is the making of a promise.50  The semantic content is the 
same in Examples 1 and 2, but the illocutionary force is different.   
Competent speakers of a natural language understand this distinction 
intuitively as a result of pragmatic enrichment.51  We are able to recog-
nize the difference in force between Example 1 and Example 2, although 
it might be a bit tricky trying to explain the difference precisely in ordi-
nary English.  Speech act theory aims to describe and explain the way 
communication works in a theoretical vocabulary that allows us to draw 
this distinction in a relatively precise way.52 
B.  Step Two: Legal Communication 
So far, we have been investigating linguistically mediated communi-
cation in general.  We now turn our attention to legal communication.  
We can begin with a typology — a preliminary and incomplete listing 
of some of the types of legal speech acts. 
1.  An Incomplete Typology: Legal Speech Acts. — Legal communi-
cations can be divided into types that have distinctive illocutionary 
forces.  When an officiant pronounces a couple as husband and husband, 
wife and wife, or wife and husband, they perform a distinctive speech 
act — marrying.  When a legislative staffer drafts a statute for  
consideration by a committee, they perform a distinctive speech act — 
proposing language for committee consideration.53  When parties nego-
tiate a contract, they may perform the distinctive speech acts of offering 
and accepting.  Here is a tentative and incomplete list of the types of 
legal speech acts: 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 49 Prediction and promise are not the only possibilities.  “I will fix the wall” could also be used 
to convey a statement of intention or plan.  I am indebted to Professor Brian Bix for this point. 
 50 If you resist this conclusion, you might imagine a richer context that makes the promise crystal 
clear. 
 51 In Example 2, Ben’s statement includes an impliciture: [Yes, I promise that] I will fix the wall.  
The implicit content is recognizable because of Alice’s preceding question. 
 52 Kar and Radin offer a similar example.  See Kar & Radin, supra note 1, at 1157–58. 
 53 The word “propose” may have a technical sense, in which only members of the legislature can 
officially “propose” a statute for consideration by a committee.  In this example, the staffer would 
not propose the statute in this technical sense.  I am grateful to Bix for this point. 
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Contractual speech acts: offering, accepting, rejecting, drafting,  
declaring an intention to breach, and rescinding. 
Constitutional speech acts: drafting, proposing for consideration by 
a constitutional convention, voting for a proposal at a convention and 
thereby proposing for ratification, voting against a proposal, and voting 
to ratify.  Similar speech acts are involved in the amendment process. 
Statutory speech acts: drafting, proposing to a committee, voting out 
of committee, voting against in committee, voting for on the floor of a 
legislative body, voting against on the floor, signing into law, speaking 
in favor of a proposal, speaking against a proposal. 
Judicial speech acts: voting for or against an outcome in conference, 
proposing a draft majority opinion, joining a draft opinion, proposing a 
draft dissenting opinion, joining a dissent, and overruling a prior  
decision. 
2.  The Situations of Legal Communication. — There are many types 
of legal communication and some of these types involve characteristic 
situations of legal communication.  The situations provide context that 
enables contextual disambiguation and pragmatic enrichments.   
Consider the distinct communicative situations involved in constitu-
tional, statutory, and judicial communication. 
(a)  The Situation of Constitutional Communication. — The nature 
of constitutional communication could be disputed, but I believe that 
the best account conceives of constitutional communication as involving 
a complex multistage process in which public meaning plays a crucial 
role.  The actual sequence of events is too complex to recount here, but 
we can imagine a simplified version of the events that resulted in the 
ratified text that was implemented by the First Congress in 179154: 
Stage One: Various proposals (such as the Virginia Plan and the New 
Jersey Plan) are circulated and discussed at the Philadelphia  
Convention. 
Stage Two: Various resolutions are introduced, debated, amended, 
and adopted by the Convention. 
Stage Three: The Committee of Detail refines these resolutions and 
proposes a coherent plan for the final drafting of the constitutional text 
as a whole, and this plan is debated on the floor of the Convention. 
Stage Four: The amended plan adopted on the floor is referred to 
the Committee of Style.  Gouverneur Morris (perhaps with the help of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 54 There are many accounts of the Constitutional Convention, including RICHARD BEEMAN, 
PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2009); EDWARD J. 
LARSON & MICHAEL P. WINSHIP, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: A NARRATIVE 
HISTORY FROM THE NOTES OF JAMES MADISON (2005); THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) (four volumes); JOHN R. VILE, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787: A COMPREHENSIVE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
AMERICA’S FOUNDING (rev. 2d ed. 2016) (two volumes).  On ratification, see PAULINE MAIER, 
RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788 (2010). 
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James Wilson and others) drafts a proposed constitutional text, which is 
then voted out of committee, debated, amended, and then adopted by 
the Convention as a whole. 
Stage Five: The constitutional text is transmitted to the Continental 
Congress and made public.  The text is then sent to state legislatures 
which in turn transmit the text to state ratifying conventions, a sufficient 
number of which approve the text.  During Stage Five, the constitu-
tional text is debated in public and in the ratifying conventions. 
Stage Six: The constitutional text is then put into action by the First 
Congress, which passes legislation governing the election of the first 
President, enacts legislation creating the structure of the new govern-
ment, and begins to exercise various powers granted to it by the new 
Constitution. 
How does this complex multistage process create “shared constitu-
tional meaning”?  Again, the full story is beyond the scope of this  
Response, but a rough sketch is possible. 
Although fragments of the constitutional text actually emerged at 
earlier stages, in the simplified model, the constitutional text is drafted 
at Stage Five.  When Gouverneur Morris drafts the text, he hopes to 
convey his communicative intentions to multiple audiences.  His imme-
diate audience likely included others who participated in the drafting 
process, followed by the other members of the Committee of Style.   
Morris aims to convey his communicative intentions to the other mem-
bers of the Committee, and they aim to recover his communicative in-
tentions.  When the delegates on the convention floor receive the draft 
from the Committee of Style, they aim to recover the communicative  
intentions of the drafters as understood by the members of the  
Committee.  And when the final constitutional text is passed to the pub-
lic, the Continental Congress, state legislatures, and eventually to imple-
menting officials, all of these readers aim to recover the communicative 
intentions of the drafters — even though it seems likely that they would 
not have known who the actual drafters were. 
In the case of constitutional communication, the drafters aimed to 
produce a text with meaning that would be accessible to the public: this 
claim is central to Public Meaning Originalism and can be called the 
“Public Meaning Thesis.”55   Justice Story stated the idea: 
 In the first place, then, every word employed in the constitution is to be 
expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the context fur-
nishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it.  Constitutions are not 
designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties, for niceties of expression, for 
critical propriety, for elaborate shades of meaning, or for the exercise of 
philosophical acuteness, or judicial research.  They are instruments of a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 55 See Lawrence B. Solum, The Public Meaning Thesis: An Originalist Account of  
Constitutional Interpretation 8 (Apr. 9, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard 
Law School Library and most recent version available from the author). 
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practical nature, founded on the common business of human life, adapted 
to common wants, designed for common use, and fitted for common under-
standings.  The people make them; the people adopt them; the people must 
be supposed to read them, with the help of common sense; and cannot be 
presumed to admit in them any recondite meaning, or any extraordinary 
gloss.56 
If the Public Meaning Thesis is correct,57 then the drafters of the 
constitutional text aimed to convey their communicative intentions to 
the public.  Subsequent readers, including the members of the  
Committee of Style, the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention, the 
public, and implementing officials and judges (including Justice Story) 
would have understood that the relevant meaning of the text was its 
public meaning.  Because the Philadelphia Convention deliberated in 
secret, the context of constitutional communication does not include 
“legislative history,” but it does include public discussion and debate, 
including the Federalist and Antifederalist Papers. 
(b)  The Situation of Statutory Communication. — Another example 
of legal communication is provided by the legislative process.  Here is a 
simplified model of statutory communication58: 
Stage One: A committee staffer drafts a proposed statute and passes 
the draft to a legislator, who introduces the draft as a proposed bill. 
Stage Two: The draft is referred to committee, where it may be dis-
cussed and amended. 
Stage Three: The committee votes to send the amended draft bill to 
the floor of the legislature, where it may be discussed and amended. 
Stage Four: The legislature votes to approve the bill and sends it to 
the executive for signature or veto. 
Stage Five: The executive signs the bill and it is published as a law. 
Of course, actual legislative processes are more complex and may 
involve bicameral legislatures, multiple committees, and multiparty ne-
gotiations among interested stakeholders who are not formally part of 
the legislature.  The actual drafter of legislative text might be a legisla-
tor, staffer, employee of an industry association or public interest group, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 56 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
436–37 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833); see also National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 398 
(1920) (“[I]n the exposition of statutes and constitutions, every word ‘is to be expounded in its plain, 
obvious, and common sense, unless the context furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge 
it,’ and there cannot be imposed upon the words ‘any recondite meaning or any extraordinary 
gloss.’” (McKenna, J., dissenting) (quoting STORY, supra, at 436–37)). 
 57 The case for the Public Meaning Thesis is made in Solum, supra note 55. 
 58 For descriptions of the actual process, see WALTER J. OLESZEK, MARK J. OLESZEK, 
ELIZABETH RYBICKI & BILL HENIFF JR., CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY 
PROCESS (10th ed. 2016); BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW 
LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (5th ed. 2017).  
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or someone else.59  When the text of a statute passes from drafter to 
member to committee to the floor, those with formal voting power may 
or may not read the text.60  A legislator who votes for a statute might 
ask a staffer to read and summarize the statutory text or might instead 
rely on advice from the leadership of their party.61 
The intended readership of a statute might be the public, but this is 
not necessarily the case.  Some statutes might be primarily aimed at a 
regulatory agency and the industry that it regulates.  If the drafter of a 
statute intends to communicate to a narrow group that employs tech-
nical language (terms of art), then the drafter may assume that the read-
ers of the statute will understand the words and phrases in their tech-
nical and not ordinary senses.  In other words, there are many different 
situations of legislative communication.  Grasping the communicative 
content of a statutory text may require a particular reader to know who 
the drafter had in mind as the intended readers of the text: if a judge is 
reading a text that was written for a regulatory agency, the judge may 
need to acquire knowledge of technical terms to grasp the communica-
tive intentions of the drafter. 
(c)  The Situation of Judicial Communication. — Judicial commu-
nication has its own complex structure.  Again, we can lay out a simpli-
fied model of communication by an appellate court: 
Stage One: After oral argument, the judges confer and make a ten-
tative opinion.  The senior judge assigns the opinion to a member of the 
panel or court. 
Stage Two: The law clerks for the judge draft a sample opinion, 
which is then edited by the judge and rewritten by the clerks.  This 
process may be repeated several times. 
Stage Three: The judge approves a draft opinion and circulates it to 
the other members of the panel or court.  Other judges may offer com-
ments, resulting in modifications to the opinion. 
Stage Four: A majority of judges join the opinion, which is then 
published. 
Of course, the actual processes are more varied.  Some judges write 
their own opinions.  Portions of an opinion may be written by someone 
other than the author judge (for instance, another judge or a law clerk 
for another judge).  Passages may be borrowed from other opinions, the 
briefs, or academic writing.  Some judges may not read draft opinions 
written by their clerks or may delegate the reading of circulated opinions 
to their clerks. 
Some judicial opinions may be self-consciously written in part for 
the public: opinions of the United States Supreme Court in high profile 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 59 See, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Con-
gressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 585–88 (2002). 
 60 See, e.g., id. at 608.  
 61 See, e.g., Jesse M. Cross, The Staffer’s Error Doctrine, 56 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 83, 98–99 (2019). 
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cases might contain passages that are intended to communicate directly 
to the general public.  But in most cases, it seems likely that judicial 
opinions are written for lawyers and judges.  Appellate opinions address 
the parties to the particular dispute, the lower court judges to whom the 
case is remanded, and future courts that may be bound by the horizontal 
or vertical stare decisis effects of the opinion.  Most judicial opinions are 
written for lawyers and judges using words in their technical legal senses 
and with an awareness of the special conventions that govern judicial 
opinions.  First-year law students become acutely aware of the gap  
between ordinary meaning and specialized legal meanings when they 
first begin to read judicial opinions — some of which may be quite dif-
ficult to comprehend. 
(d)  The Importance of Multiple Intended Readers in Complex Mul-
tistage Legal Communication. — In each of the situations described 
above, legal communication includes multiple stages and multiple in-
tended readers.  Thus, the drafter of a constitutional provision at the 
Philadelphia Convention intended to communicate to the public, but 
also to committee members, other members of the Convention, the  
Continental Congress, the ratifying conventions, officials who will im-
plement the Constitution, and judges who will resolve disputes arising 
under the Constitution.  The drafter of a statute may intend to com-
municate to legislators, staffers, lawyers, judges, and regulators, in the 
case of a regulatory statute — or to the public rather than regulators in 
the case of a general criminal law that applies to the public at large.  
The drafter of a judicial opinion intends to communicate to judges and 
lawyers as the primary intended readership, although some opinions 
may include passages intended to be read by the public. 
Multiple readerships create the possibility that a drafter’s communi-
cative intentions will be understood differently by different categories 
of readers.  Such divergence may be unintentional.  The drafter of a 
statute may not have anticipated the regulators and courts would have 
different understandings of the same statutory language.62  But it is also 
the case that a drafter might deliberately attempt to communicate dif-
ferent content to different readerships.  A constitutional clause might be 
drafted to be susceptible of an innocuous interpretation during the rati-
fication process but a more radical interpretation by implementing offi-
cials and by courts.63 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 62 This leads to the set of issues addressed by the Chevron doctrine.  See Lawrence B. Solum & 
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Construction, 105 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3300626 [https://perma.cc/59F3-KK6D]. 
 63 This possibility is raised by Professor John Mikhail’s discussion of the Necessary and Proper 
Clauses and their relationship to the Preamble.  See John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper 
Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1070 (2014) (“Wilson and the other principal framers of the Constitu-
tion knew exactly what they wanted to accomplish by adding a complex and ambiguous sweeping 
  
40 HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 133:23 
Similarly, written contracts may have multiple intended readerships.  
A contract might be drafted with an intended readership that encom-
passes both the contracting parties and judges in the event of a dispute 
that results in litigation.  Divergent meanings might arise inadvertently, 
but it is also possible that a drafter might deliberately communicate one 
message to a contractual partner and a different message to a judge.  
This possibility is discussed below in connection with the distinction 
between strategic and cooperative communication.64 
3.  The Conceptual Structure of Legal Communication. — Three 
foundational distinctions are prerequisites to any understanding of legal 
communication.  The first distinction is that between communicative 
content and legal content.  The second distinction marks the difference 
between “interpretation” (the discovery of the communicative content of 
a legal speech act) and “construction” (the determination of the legal 
effect given to that content).  The third distinction is between “coopera-
tive” and “strategic” communication.  Each distinction is considered in 
turn. 
(a)  First Distinction: Communicative Content and Legal Content. — 
The first foundation distinction is between communicative content and 
legal content.65  One way to approach this distinction begins with the 
idea of “content” itself and then proceeds to unpack the difference  
between the communicative content of a legal text and the legal content 
associated with that text. 
When I use the word “content” and the phrase “communicative con-
tent” I do not mean to refer to words, phrases, and sentences.  I am using 
“content” to refer to abstract entities such as concepts and propositions.  
Words are used to represent concepts.  The word “law” in English rep-
resents the same concept as the word “ley” in Spanish.  And the concept 
of law can be expressed in English using other words, such as “system 
of legal norms.”  As words are to concepts, so sentences are to  
propositions.  When I write a sentence in English, I express a proposition 
that could be translated into another language or paraphrased using a 
different English sentence. 
The communicative content of a legal text is conceptually distinct 
from the legal content.  For example, the Constitution of the  
Confederacy has communicative content, but that legal text does not 
produce legal content.  No propositions of law follow from the  
Confederate constitution.  Likewise, a draft written contract can have 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
clause to the end of the list of enumerated powers in the Constitution.  Indeed, the best reading of 
the evidence suggests that they probably saw this ambiguity as a virtue rather than a vice.”). 
 64 See infra section I.B.3(c), pp. 43–45. 
 65 See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 480 (2013). 
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communicative content, but if it is not signed by the parties, it produces 
no legal content. 
Similarly, the legal content associated with a text can be different 
from its communicative content.  For example,66 the First Amendment 
begins “Congress shall pass no law,”67 but the Supreme Court has  
applied the freedom of expression to the judicial branch in cases like 
New York Times v. Sullivan.68  The legal content associated with a con-
tract can vary from its communicative content for a variety of reasons.  
Contract law includes “default rules” that provide legal content that is 
not included in the contract itself.69  Similarly, the “mandatory rules” of  
contract law forbid certain kinds of agreements, for example, those that 
are contrary to public policy.70 
Communicative content and legal content are conceptually distinct: 
cases of divergence are important, because they make the distinction 
visible.  But in many legal contexts, the communicative content of a 
legal text is an important determinant of the legal content produced by 
the text.  Indeed, many of the great disputes in legal theory are about 
the proper relationship between communicative content and legal con-
tent.  Consider the following familiar examples: 
Public Meaning Originalism affirms the Constraint Principle: the 
original public meaning of the constitutional text should constrain the 
legal content of constitutional doctrine.71  Many versions of living con-
stitutionalism reject the Constraint Principle and affirm a power for 
constitutional actors, including judges, to adopt constitutional construc-
tions that are inconsistent with communicative content of the text.72 
Plain Meaning Textualism affirms that the plain meaning  
(communicative content) of a statutory text should constrain the legal 
content of statutory constructions.  Purposivism affirms that the legal 
content of statutory constructions should be determined by the objective 
purpose or function of the statutory text, even if the resulting construc-
tions are inconsistent with the communicative content of the text. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 66 For a further discussion of this example, please see id. at 512.  
 67 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 68 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (extending First Amendment protections of the freedom of the press to a 
state-created defamation law).  
 69 For a further discussion of this example, please see Solum, supra note 65, at 493–94. 
 70 See Lawrence B. Solum, The Boundaries of Legal Discourse and the Debate over Default 
Rules in Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 311, 312 (1993). 
 71 See generally Lawrence B. Solum, The Constraint Principle: Original Meaning and Constitu-
tional Practice 2–3 (Mar. 24, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2940215 
[https://perma.cc/KMY2-568H]. 
 72 See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism: The Concep-
tual Structure of the Great Debate, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1243, 1271–77 (2019). 
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The theoretical debates between originalists and living constitution-
alists and between textualists and purposivists provide examples of the 
importance of the theoretical distinction between communicative con-
tent and legal content. 
(b)  Second Distinction: Interpretation and Construction. — The  
second distinction is between interpretation and construction.73  The 
distinction has a long history in American legal theory,74 including  
important work done by the great contract treatise writer, Arthur 
Corbin.75  For the purposes of this Response, I will stipulate the follow-
ing definitions: 
Interpretation is the activity that discerns the meaning (communica-
tive content) of an utterance or text. 
Construction is the activity that determines the content of constitu-
tional doctrine and the legal effect of an utterance or text. 
In the context of contract law, there are two important contexts in 
which interpretation and construction frequently operate: 
Contract Formation: When a court addresses contract formation is-
sues, it may need to determine the communicative content of oral or 
written exchanges (interpretation); once we know the meaning of the 
communications between the parties, we then can ask whether  
particular utterances or writings constitute a legally effective offer and 
acceptance (construction). 
Contract Interpretation and Construction: When a court addresses 
the issues that arise when a contract is breached, it may need to deter-
mine the communicative content of a written or oral contract  
(interpretation).  Once the meaning of a contract’s terms has been  
ascertained, the court may then need to determine their legal effect  
(construction). 
Interpretation and construction operate in contract law and in many 
other contexts, including constitutional interpretation and construction, 
statutory interpretation and construction, and so forth. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 73 See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013); Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinc-
tion, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010). 
 74 For the history of the interpretation-construction distinction, see Solum, Originalism and Con-
stitutional Construction, supra note 73, at 487–88.  See also Ralf Poscher, The Hermeneutical Char-
acter of Legal Construction, in LAW’S HERMENEUTICS: OTHER INVESTIGATIONS 207, 207–08 
(Simone Glanert & Fabien Girard eds., 2017); Greg Klass, Interpretation and Construction 1:  
Francis Lieber, NEW PRIV. L. (Nov. 19, 2015), http://blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/11/19/ 
interpretation-and-construction-1-francis-lieber-greg-klass [https://perma.cc/5EM4-RPLC]; Greg 
Klass, Interpretation and Construction 2: Samuel Williston, NEW PRIV. L.  (Nov. 23, 2015), 
https://blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/11/23/interpretation-and-construction-2-samuel-williston-
greg-klass [https://perma.cc/HF64-UQJV]; Greg Klass, Interpretation and Construction 3: Arthur 
Linton Corbin, NEW PRIV. L.  (Nov. 25, 2015), http://blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/11/25/ 
interpretation-and-construction-3-arthur-linton-corbin-greg-klass [https://perma.cc/G7RD-PHVS].  
 75 See Klass, Interpretation and Construction 3: Arthur Linton Corbin, supra note 74. 
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(c)  Third Distinction: Strategic and Cooperative Legal Communica-
tion. — The third distinction is between two kinds of legal communica-
tion, “strategic” and “cooperative.”  One way to approach this distinction 
is via Jürgen Habermas’s distinction between “communicative action” 
and “strategic action.”  Habermas defined communicative and strategic 
action as follows: 
I count as communicative action those linguistically mediated interactions 
in which all participants pursue illocutionary aims, and only illocutionary 
aims, with their mediating acts of communication.  On the other hand, I 
regard as linguistically mediated strategic action those interactions in which 
at least one of the participants wants with his speech acts to produce perlo-
cutionary effects on his opposite number.76 
Through communicative action, the participants “pursue illocution-
ary aims without reservation in order to arrive at an agreement that will 
provide the basis for a consensual coordination of individually pursued 
plans of action.”77  The key idea here is the communicative action in-
volves “consensual coordination,” an idea that resonates with the foun-
dational notion of consent in contract law and theory. 
Adapting Habermas’s basic distinction between communicative ac-
tion and strategic action to legal communication, we can distinguish be-
tween cooperative legal communication and strategic legal communica-
tion.  Let us mark the distinction via two definitions: 
Cooperative Legal Communication: Legal communication is cooper-
ative if and only if the drafter or speaker aims to make the same com-
municative content reasonably available to each and every intended 
reader or listener without deception. 
Strategic Legal Communication: Legal communication is strategic if 
and only if the drafter or speaker intends to convey different  
communicative contents to different intended readers or listeners or to 
convey a message that is deceptive. 
These definitions should be viewed as tentative and subject to revi-
sion.  Complex issues are involved in the precise differentiation of coop-
erative and strategic legal communication.  These definitions provide a 
“rough and ready” formulation, but further reflection would undoubt-
edly prompt further revisions and refinements.  These definitions are 
general, in that they apply to various types of legal communication but 
can be adapted to differentiate between cooperative and strategic  
contractual communication, constitutional communication, statutory 
communication, and so forth. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 76 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 295 (Thomas  
McCarthy trans., 1984); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory 
of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54, 91–93 (1989). 
 77 HABERMAS, supra note 76, at 295–96. 
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The relationship between cooperative versus strategic contractual 
communication and Kar and Radin’s notion of shared versus unshared 
meaning is complex.  Recall that “shared meaning” is communicative 
content that is grasped by both parties to the agreement.78  In the case 
of an oral contract, the meaning is shared if the communicative content 
of the offer made by one party is grasped by the party accepting the 
offer.  In the case of a written contract with terms drafted by a third 
party, shared meaning requires that both parties glean identical commu-
nicative content from the text of the agreement. 
One way to understand this relationship is via a simple three dimen-
sional two-by-two-by-two matrix.  Although the relationship between 
“shared versus unshared meaning” and “cooperative versus strategic 
communication” exists in many contexts, both legal and nonlegal, the 
matrix examines this relationship in the contractual context.  The first 
dimension (horizontal) is “shared meaning” versus “unshared meaning.”  
The second dimension (vertical) is “cooperative contractual communi-
cation” versus “strategic contractual communication.”  The third dimen-
sion (represented by two subcells) is “written” versus “oral” contractual 
agreements.  The matrix yields eight examples: 
Table 1: Sharing and Cooperation in Oral and Written Contracts 
Examples in each cell 
assume two contract-
ing parties. 




1. Oral Contract: 
Oral contract, negoti-
ated in good faith, 
terms are mutually 
understood. 
5. Oral Contract: 
Oral contract, good 
faith offer misfires 
and the offeror and 
offeree have different 
understandings. 
2. Written Contract: 
Written form con-
tract that is actually 
understood by both 
parties. 
6. Written Contract: 
Terms were not read 







3. Oral Contract: 
Oral offer and ac-
ceptance, offeror ac-
cepts knowing that 
the legal effect of the 
contract will vary 
7. Oral Contract: Of-
feror proposes terms 
with different ordi-
nary and legal mean-
ings with intent to 
deceive offeree. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 78 See supra section I.A.1, pp. 26–27. 
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from the communica-
tive content to the of-
feror’s advantage. 
4. Written Contract: 
Written contract, 
read and understood 
by both sides, but one 
party intends to 
breach and evade lia-
bility (fraud). 
8. Written Contract: 
Consumer contract of 
adhesion, terms were 
not read or under-
stood, drafter in-
cluded terms that 
were not reasonably 
anticipatable. 
 
The matrix illustrates the ways in which the distinctions between 
“shared and unshared meaning” and “cooperative and strategic commu-
nications” can operate in the context of contractual communication.  
Strategic communication can involve shared meaning; cooperative com-
munication can involve unshared meaning.  But it is also the case that 
strategic contractual communication can operate via unshared meaning, 
and that cooperative communication can employ shared meaning. 
II.  APPLICATION OF THE GENERAL THEORY  
TO CONTRACTUAL COMMUNICATION 
We are now in a position to apply what we have learned about com-
munication in general and legal communication in particular to contrac-
tual communication.  Our aim will be to investigate Kar and Radin’s 
theory of shared contractual meaning and its implications for contract 
doctrine and theory. 
Some readers may be puzzled by the extended discussion of legal 
communication in general in a response that focuses on contractual com-
munication.  After all, contract law is conventionally understood as a 
distinct and bounded doctrinal field — governed by a set of legal norms 
that are semiautonomous.  If contract law is semiautonomous, then we 
might suppose that contractual communication can be understood  
without reference to the implications of the philosophy of language and 
theoretical linguistics for legal communication in general.  These 
thoughts seem reasonable, but the view advanced in this Response is 
that they are fundamentally misguided.  Contractual communication re-
lies on the same mechanisms as other forms of written and oral commu-
nication.  Without an appreciation of the semantic and pragmatic mech-
anisms that enable all linguistic communication, any attempt to theorize 
contract law will be impoverished. 
Contractual communication relies on the same semantic and  
pragmatic mechanisms that enable ordinary face-to-face conversations.  
Indeed, some contracts are the products of face-to-face oral exchanges, 
and the legal effect of those exchanges is governed by the law of offer 
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and acceptance.  But many written contracts involve communicative 
situations that depart in important ways from a face-to-face conversa-
tion.  In this regard, contractual communication resembles other forms 
of legal communication that involve complex multistage processes.  Con-
stitutions and statutes are drafted by one set of actors, proposed and 
debated by others, and ratified or enacted by legislatures or referenda.  
Written contracts may be drafted by lawyers who borrow language from 
contracts or models drafted by other lawyers.  Understanding the com-
plex multistage processes of legal communication in general is therefore 
an essential step toward an adequate theory of complex multistage con-
tractual communication. 
The investigation can begin by laying out a typology of the situations 
of contractual communication. 
A.  The Situation(s) of Contractual  
(and Pseudo-Contractual) Communication 
Contract law is very flexible.  There are many kinds of contracts and 
a huge variety of situations in which contractual communication occurs.  
To simplify our task, I will limit my examination of the situations of 
contractual communication to four prototypes. 
1.  Negotiated Oral Contracts. — The first prototype is a negotiated 
oral contract between individuals.  Consider the following exchange be-
tween Ben, a homeowner, and Alice, a handyperson: 
Ben: Can you fix the faucet? 
Alice: Yep.  Fifty. 
Ben: Fifty dollars?  Can you do it today? 
Alice: Yep.  Won’t take more than a half hour. 
Ben: Great.  I’ll get out of your way. 
Alice: I’m going out to my truck to get some parts.  Back in a minute. 
Alice completes the work, says, “I’m done,” and Ben pays Alice fifty 
dollars in cash, saying, “Thank you.  That was fast.” 
Notice that in this exchange, the speech acts of offer and acceptance 
are less than fully explicit.  Ben does not say, “I offer you fifty dollars to 
fix the faucet located in this bathroom by 5:00 p.m. today.”  Alice does 
not say, “I accept your offer.”  Nonetheless, Alice communicates an offer 
and Ben accepts.  The semantic content of their exchange is supple-
mented by pragmatic enrichment.  When Ben explicitly says “great,” the 
impliciture is “I agree” or “I accept your offer to do the work for fifty 
dollars in 30 minutes.”  Both Ben and Alice are able to convey their 
communicative intentions based on their shared understanding of the 
communicative situation. 
2.  Form Contracts Adopted by Sophisticated Parties. — The second 
prototype is a form contract adopted by sophisticated parties to handle 
a routine transaction.  One example of such a contract is the Master 
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Power Purchase & Sale Agreement (“Master Contract”) drafted by  
Edison Electric Institute (EEI) to govern wholesale purchases and sales 
of electricity.79  The Master Contract is forty-three pages in length and 
includes complex terms expressed using technical terminology.80  The 
Master Contract was drafted by a working group, described as follows: 
  The [EEI] Contract Working Group (CWG) is a broad group of market 
participants that includes risk managers and other stakeholders who are 
interested in providing input to the [EEI Contract Drafting Committee 
(CDC)] and staying abreast of its activities.  Both the CDC and CWG  
include representation not just from shareholder-owned utilities but all mar-
ket participants (e.g., coops, banks and marketers, as well as outside  
counsels).81 
The actual process of drafting the Master Contract in the EEI  
Contract Drafting Committee may be opaque to parties who employ the 
Master Contract.  But they understand that the contract was drafted for 
a particular purpose with a particular set of readers in mind.82  The 
Master Contract reads as a document that was drafted to be compre-
hensible to the lawyers and sophisticated players who are employed by 
the corporate entities that enter into such agreements and to lawyers 
and judges who may become involved if a dispute arises and results in 
litigation.83 
In actual practice, the Master Contract may or may not result in 
shared meaning.  For example, if a set of contracting parties have relied 
on the Master Contract in a series of transactions over time, it is possible 
that the various agents and employees who employ the contract have 
changed.  At T1, it might have been the case that all of the key players 
for all of the parties had actually read the Master Contract and hence 
that the communicative intentions of the drafters (the EEI Contract 
Drafting Committee) were successfully conveyed to the responsible 
agents of the contracting parties.  Suppose that at T2, the Master  
Contract is modified by the EEI Contract Drafting Committee, perhaps 
in response to the recognition of a problem in the original Master  
Contract.  At T3, however, it might be the case that some of the key 
players have been replaced by others who have not actually read all of 
the revised Master Contract — indeed, they might be unaware of the 
changes from the original version.  In this situation, the communicative 
intentions of the drafters may not have been conveyed to the responsible 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 79 Master Contract, EDISON ELECTRIC INST., https://www.eei.org/resourcesandmedia/ 
mastercontract/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/8CXD-WDF9].  
 80 Master Power Purchase & Sale Agreement, EDISON ELECTRIC INST. (Apr. 25, 2000), 
https://www.eei.org/resourcesandmedia/mastercontract/Documents/contract0004.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R7BD-GS5A]. 
 81 Working Group and Contract Drafting Committee, EDISON ELECTRIC INST., 
https://www.eei.org/resourcesandmedia/mastercontract/Pages/WorkingGroupandContract 
DraftingCommittee.aspx [https://perma.cc/B8LF-U6AN]. 
 82 See Master Contract, supra note 79 (explaining the purpose and goals of the Master Contract).  
 83 See Master Power Purchase & Sale Agreement, supra note 80, at 6–11. 
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agents of one or more of the parties.  It is at least possible that the Master 
Contract might be adopted without any of the agents of any of the par-
ties having fully grasped the communicative content of the contract.  
The meaning of the Master Contract may be accessible to the responsi-
ble agents of all the parties without actually bringing “shared meaning” 
into existence. 
3.  Negotiated Complex Agreements Between Business Entities. — 
The third prototype is a negotiated complex agreement between busi-
ness entities.  Unlike the second prototype, which involved an “off-the-
shelf” Master Contract, the third prototype involves clause-by-clause 
negotiation involving lawyers and other agents of the business entities.  
Of course, clause-by-clause negotiation does not require the parties to 
start from scratch.  A bespoke contract may involve reuse of contractual 
language from prior agreements.  Standard clauses and phrases may be 
combined in new ways with language that is created for the particular 
occasion.  Standard contractual provisions are sometimes called  
“boilerplate.”84 
Boilerplate contractual language is common because of the ad-
vantages it offers to contracting business entities.  Ready-to-wear busi-
ness suits from Men’s Wearhouse are cheaper than bespoke garments 
from Savile Row: boilerplate is less expensive than custom-tailored con-
tractual language.  Boilerplate that has generated judicial interpreta-
tions may come to have a standardized legal meaning and hence lead to 
predictable outcomes.  As Professors Stephen Choi, Mitu Gulati, and 
Robert Scott explain: 
Boilerplate terms are ubiquitous in commercial contracting because they 
offer the efficiency advantages of standardization.  Those advantages in-
clude the development of a uniform system of communication that is inde-
pendent of any particular contractual context.  Thus, parties in  
heterogeneous environments who wish to communicate a shared intent can 
embody that intent in a fixed and reliable formulation whose meaning does 
not vary with the nature of the contract or its context.85 
The process of contractual communication involving boilerplate is 
complex.  A boilerplate clause is initially drafted by a lawyer and in-
cluded in a contract.  The clause becomes accessible to other lawyers, 
perhaps because it is discussed and interpreted in a judicial opinion.  
The clause is then incorporated by other lawyers in new contracts, which 
in turn are copied again.  This process may result in communicative 
content that is stable over time and shared by relevant agents of the 
parties and by judges who interpret the language when disputes arise.  
In such cases, the communicative intentions of the original drafter are 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 84 For discussion of boilerplate, see generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE 
FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013); and Stephen J. Choi, Mitu 
Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1 
(2017). 
 85 Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 84, at 4–5 (footnote omitted).  
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successfully grasped by readers who reuse the text and successfully con-
vey these communicative intentions to yet other readers. 
But this is not necessarily the case.  When boilerplate is originally 
drafted, the situation of contractual communication is bounded: a clause 
is written in the context of a particular transaction for the parties and 
possibly for the judges who might be called upon to interpret the text in 
the case of a dispute.  But when the text is reused, the communicative 
situation is transformed and hence the communicative content of the 
clause may change over time.  Such changes are not particularly prob-
lematic if the parties to a new contract incorporating old boilerplate 
communicate successfully, but there is no guarantee that boilerplate will 
result in shared meaning.  The meaning of a boilerplate provision 
drafted at T1 for Contract One may not carry over to Contract Two at 
T2.  The words may be the same while the meaning is different — same 
text, different communicative content. 
Choi, Gulati, and Scott discuss the extreme case, in which a boiler-
plate clause utterly fails to create shared communicative content: 
But standardized terms in boilerplate contracts between sophisticated par-
ties are vulnerable to misinterpretation.  At the limit, a boilerplate term that 
is reused for decades and without reflection merely because it is part of a 
standard-form package of terms, can be emptied of any recoverable mean-
ing: this creates a contractual black hole.  More commonly, terms that have 
lost much meaning still may provoke litigation over essentially meaningless 
variations in the boilerplate language.  In this latter case of contractual grey 
holes, courts may be functionally incapable of devising a plausible meaning 
that was attached to the linguistic variations at the time the contract was 
drafted.  Thus, regardless of whether a boilerplate term has lost all or only 
almost all meaning, courts will face an interpretation conundrum that we 
collectively term the “black hole” problem.86 
The key to understanding the black hole problem is the realization 
that a boilerplate clause can be copied mechanically, without the drafter 
forming a communicative intention.  This problem comes into particu-
larly clear focus in the context of “cut and paste” drafting, where a law-
yer might draft a contract by electronically copying text and pasting it 
into a new contract without even reading the clause.  In such a case, the 
drafter of the contract has no first-order communicative intentions of 
their own — although the drafter might formulate a second-order com-
municative intention to adopt some prior understanding (such as the 
communicative intention of the original drafter or the shared meaning 
that the clause had for the parties to the prior contract).87 
One famous example of the reuse of standard contractual language 
is the “pari passu” clause included in sovereign debt agreements.  “Pari 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 86 Id. at 3–4 (footnotes omitted). 
 87 On second-order communicative intentions, see infra section II.D, pp. 66–67. 
  
50 HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 133:23 
passu” is Latin and could be translated literally as “with even step.”88  
The phrase appears in clauses like this: “The Notes rank, and will rank, 
pari passu in right of payment with all other present and future unse-
cured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness of the Issuer.”89 
The conventional understanding of such clauses was that the Notes 
(debt instruments) “were intended to stand on the same level footing 
without preference or priority among themselves.”90  Choi, Gulati, and 
Scott argue that pari passu clauses no longer have clear communicative 
content: 
[T]he [contemporary meaning of the] pari passu clause, a boilerplate formu-
lation common to sovereign debt contracts for nearly 200 years . . . [is] hope-
lessly unclear.  The recent history of judicial interpretation of this clause 
began in Brussels in a case against the Republic of Peru in September 2000, 
in which a court issued the first interpretation of the clause in at least a half 
century.  The same interpretation of pari passu was affirmed by a federal 
court in New York in a case against the Republic of Argentina in December 
2011, and affirmed again on appeal in that same case in October 2012 and 
August 2013.  In each of these cases, the courts endorsed an interpretation 
of a particular variation of pari passu that required holdout creditors to be 
paid in full as a condition to the sovereigns paying consenting creditors un-
der a restructuring agreement.  Even though this interpretation effectively 
undermined efforts by sovereigns to restructure their bonds, and even 
though the courts’ interpretation was widely vilified in the market, mean-
ingful revisions to the language of the boilerplate term did not even begin 
to appear until late 2014.91 
If the story told by Choi, Gulati, and Scott is correct, pari passu 
clauses failed to create shared meaning.  The drafters of sovereign debt 
agreements may not have given much thought to the meaning of the 
clause or they may have mistakenly assumed the clause would receive a 
judicial construction in line with the expectations of the parties to sov-
ereign debt agreements. 
The pari passu clause example illustrates the importance of attending 
to the actual situation of contractual communication.  On the surface, a 
complex negotiated contract between business entities seems to resemble 
a face-to-face negotiated oral contract, but the surface appearance is 
misleading.  In the first prototype (Ben and Alice negotiating a faucet 
repair),92 communicative intentions are successfully conveyed, resulting 
in the acceptance of an offer and the creation of a contract.  But in the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 88 Google Translate, GOOGLE, https://translate.google.com/#view=home&op= 
translate&sl=la&tl=en&text=pari%20passu [https://perma.cc/5LP3-CK8J].  
 89 Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 
53 EMORY L.J. 869, 871 (2004). 
 90 FRANCIS BEAUFORT PALMER, COMPANY PRECEDENTS 110 (8th ed. 1902). 
 91 Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 84, at 6 (footnotes omitted).  
 92 See supra section II.A.1, p. 46. 
  
2019] CONTRACTUAL COMMUNICATION 51 
case of boilerplate clauses that create “black hole problems,” the drafter 
does not have the requisite first-order communicative intentions: the ne-
gotiations fail to produce shared communicative content. 
4.  Contracts of Adhesion. — The fourth prototype is a contract of 
adhesion between a business entity and a consumer.  One example of 
such an agreement is the “Google Terms of Service,”93 to which users 
may agree when they first use various Google services, such as Gmail,94 
Google Calendar,95 or Google Drive.96  A contract of adhesion is a stand-
ard form contract that is offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis: by defini-
tion a contract of adhesion is not negotiated.97  The Google Terms of 
Service agreement is a contract of adhesion, because the terms are stand-
ard and nonnegotiable.  I haven’t actually tried to negotiate with Google 
over the terms of service, but I am willing to bet that any such attempt 
would be unsuccessful: Google offers Gmail on a “take-it-or-leave-it” 
basis. 
The Google Terms of Service are relatively short, although they con-
tain cross references to other terms, such as Google’s “Privacy Policy.”98  
My impression is that the Google Terms of Service are mostly written 
in clear and concise language that can be understood by competent 
speakers of standard American English, but some provisions do incor-
porate legal terms of art.  Here are some examples: 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 93 Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE (Oct. 25, 2017), https://policies.google.com/terms?hl= 
en-US [https://perma.cc/WSL9-RXHZ].  
 94 Get More Done with Gmail, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/gmail/about 
[https://perma.cc/7KDC-5ULK].  
 95 Google Calendar, GOOGLE, https://calendar.google.com/calendar [https://perma.cc/Y534-
M6LC]. 
 96 Google Drive, GOOGLE, https://google.com/drive [https://perma.cc/H9T7-S6W3]. 
 97 Professor Todd Rakoff offers the following definition: 
 (1) The document whose legal validity is at issue is a printed form that contains many 
terms and clearly purports to be a contract. 
 (2) The form has been drafted by, or on behalf of, one party to the transaction. 
 (3) The drafting party participates in numerous transactions of the type represented 
by the form and enters into these transactions as a matter of routine. 
 (4) The form is presented to the adhering party with the representation that, except 
perhaps for a few identified items (such as the price term), the drafting party will enter 
into the transaction only on the terms contained in the document.  This representation 
may be explicit or may be implicit in the situation, but it is understood by the adherent. 
 (5) After the parties have dickered over whatever terms are open to bargaining, the 
document is signed by the adherent. 
 (6) The adhering party enters into few transactions of the type represented by the 
form — few, at least, in comparison with the drafting party. 
 (7) The principal obligation of the adhering party in the transaction considered as a 
whole is the payment of money. 
Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1177 
(1983) (footnote omitted). 
 98 Google Privacy Policy, GOOGLE (Oct. 15, 2019), https://policies.google.com/privacy?hl= 
en-US [https://perma.cc/U7HD-YJ4W].  
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  Some of our Services allow you to upload, submit, store, send or receive 
content.  You retain ownership of any intellectual property rights that you 
hold in that content.  In short, what belongs to you stays yours. 
  SOME JURISDICTIONS PROVIDE FOR CERTAIN 
WARRANTIES, LIKE THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF 
MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 
AND NON-INFRINGEMENT.  TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY 
LAW, WE EXCLUDE ALL WARRANTIES. 
 The laws of California, U.S.A., excluding California’s conflict of laws 
rules, will apply to any disputes arising out of or relating to these terms or 
the Services.  All claims arising out of or relating to these terms or the  
Services will be litigated exclusively in the federal or state courts of Santa 
Clara County, California, USA, and you and Google consent to personal 
jurisdiction in those courts.99 
I don’t know who drafted the text of the Google Terms of Service, 
but it seems plausible (and perhaps likely) that they were drafted by 
Google’s in-house lawyers.  Perhaps an initial draft was written and 
edited, with subsequent versions edited by the original drafters or by 
new lawyers who were not part of the original drafting process.  It seems 
quite likely that any particular posted version of the Google Terms of 
Service was actually read and understood by some lawyer who ap-
proved the final version.  Once again, we have a multistage process of 
communication, in which the communicative intentions of the drafters 
of various clauses are conveyed to others who participate in the drafting 
process.  The drafters likely understand that the terms they write will 
sometimes be read by Google users and may also be read by lawyers 
and judges if disputes arise. 
B.  The Idea of Shared Meaning 
The discussion that follows interrogates Kar and Radin’s notion of 
“shared meaning.”  What is required for “meaning” to be “shared”?  How 
does shared meaning relate to the Gricean notion of speaker’s meaning 
and Austin’s idea of a speech act?  The discussion that follows suggests 
two distinct conceptions of “shared meaning” before turning to an in-
depth investigation of Kar and Radin’s version. 
1.  “Shared Meaning” as Successfully Communicated Content and 
Force. — Contractual communication can be explicated via Kar and 
Radin’s idea of “shared meaning,” the Gricean notion of communicative 
intentions, and Austin’s idea of illocutionary force.  For example, in ne-
gotiated oral contracts, the parties create shared meaning if they are able 
to successfully convey their communicative intentions.  Notice that  
success requires mutual recognition of both the content and force of the 
offer and the acceptance.  Mutual recognition of content requires that 
the offeror’s communicative intention to offer particular terms (content) 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 99 Google Terms of Service, supra note 93.  
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be successfully conveyed to the offeree — and that these terms be rec-
ognized by the offeree as the speech act of offering (force). 
These abstract ideas are illustrated by Raffles v. Wichelhaus,100 com-
monly known as the ship “Peerless” case.  Judge Mellish explained: 
There is nothing on the face of the contract to shew that any particular ship 
called the “Peerless” was meant; but the moment it appears that two ships 
called the “Peerless” were about to sail from Bombay there is a latent am-
biguity, and parol evidence may be given for the purpose of shewing that 
the defendant meant one “Peerless” and the plaintiff another.  That being 
so, there was no consenus [sic] ad item, and therefore no binding contract.101 
The report is brief and does not include a narrative of offer and ac-
ceptance, but the following account seems plausible.  There is no dispute 
about the illocutionary force of the offer and acceptance.  Both parties 
agreed that there was an attempt to enter into agreement; the commu-
nicative intentions to engage in the speech acts of offering and accepting 
were successfully conveyed.  Nonetheless, the communication misfired 
because the content of the offer contained a proper name (“Peerless”) 
that had two possible referents, the two ships that had the name  
“Peerless.”102  The offeror failed to successfully convey the content of 
their offer to the offeree. 
Contractual communication can misfire for a different reason: the 
communicative intention to convey a particular illocutionary force can 
misfire.  A communication not intended to have the force of an offer 
might nonetheless be understood as such.103  A communication not in-
tended to have the force of an acceptance might be misconstrued as an 
acceptance.  Successful contractual communication requires mutual 
recognition of both content and force. 
Contractual communication can fail, but it can also succeed.  When 
the communicative intentions of an offeror with respect to both force 
and content are successfully communicated to an offeree who then  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 100 (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375; 2 Hurl. & C. 906.  See generally A. W. Brian Simpson, Contracts 
for Cotton to Arrive: The Case of the Two Ships Peerless, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 287 (1989). 
 101 Raffles, 159 Eng. Rep. at 376. 
 102 Raffles involved a proper name, but the same problem can arise with respect to terms that 
represent some general concept or kind of thing.  Thus, in Indiana Fuel Supply Co. v. Indianapolis 
Basket Co., 84 N.E. 776 (Ind. App. 1908), the offeror and offeree had different understandings of 
the phrase “egg coal”: 
If in this case the terms of the contract entered into by the parties would properly describe 
domestic egg coal, and could be understood by either of the parties as meaning domestic 
egg coal, and would also describe steam egg coal, and could be understood by either of 
the parties as meaning steam egg coal, and one of them had in mind when he contracted 
for egg coal the higher grade of coal, and the other had in mind when entering into the 
contract the lower grade of coal, and each party believed that by the terms of the contract 
he was contracting for the particular kind of coal he had in mind, then no contract was 
entered into between the parties. 
Id. at 777; see also William F. Young, Jr., Equivocation in the Making of Agreements, 64 COLUM. 
L. REV. 619, 625 (1964) (discussing Indiana Fuel, Raffles, and similar cases). 
 103 See Tiersma, supra note 42, at 225; see also Lawrence M. Solan, Contract as Agreement, 83 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 353, 361 (2007). 
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successfully conveys both the force and content of an acceptance, the 
result could be called “shared meaning.”  In negotiated oral contracts, 
communicative intentions may be conveyed semantically by explicit 
statements, but this is not required, because an offer or acceptance may 
be conveyed implicitly as a result of pragmatic enrichment.  The first 
interpretation of the idea of shared meaning is successfully communi-
cated content and force that results in an actual agreement between the 
parties. 
Notice, however, that outside of negotiated oral contracts, the parties 
may view themselves as having entered into a contract despite the fact 
that the full content of the agreement is not actually shared.  Consider 
the following scenarios: 
Scenario One: The parties to a complex transaction use a standard 
form agreement (such as the EEI Master Contract) without realizing 
that one of the salient terms in the form has changed since the last time 
at which agents of the parties thoroughly vetted the form.  When the 
parties enter into the agreement they have a shared understanding of 
the illocutionary force of their communications (for example, offer and 
acceptance), but neither party’s agents actually comprehend the full con-
tent of the form. 
Scenario Two: The parties to a complex transaction negotiate a be-
spoke agreement without realizing a particular boilerplate clause has a 
standard meaning with legal consequences to which they would not 
have agreed (such as the pari passu clause that was contained in many 
sovereign debt agreements).  Again, there is a shared understanding of 
illocutionary force, but neither party’s agents actually comprehend the 
content of the clause. 
Scenario Three: The consumer who agrees to a contract of adhesion 
(such as the Google Terms of Service) does not read the agreement but 
understands that they are agreeing to something that they have chosen 
not to read.  Again, there can be mutual understanding of force, but the 
content of the agreement is only understood by the agents of the business 
entity. 
In each of these examples, there is no “shared meaning” if we under-
stand shared meaning to require the successful communication of both 
force and content.  In Scenarios One and Two, the conventional under-
standing would be that the parties have entered into a contract despite 
the absence of “shared meaning” in the sense of successfully communi-
cated force and content.  Scenario Three is open to dispute: perhaps 
there is a contract, perhaps not. 
If “shared meaning” requires successful communication of both force 
and content and if “shared meaning” is required for “contract,” then the 
agreements in Scenarios One, Two, and Three are not “contracts” and 
should instead be denominated “pseudo-contracts” (Kar and Radin’s ter-
minology).  On the other hand, perhaps one or more of these scenarios 
should be understood as involving proper “contracts.”  If so, that would 
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raise a question about either the nature of “shared meaning” or the  
requirement that an agreement involve “shared meaning” in order to be 
properly denominated a “contract.”  What happens if we propose a less 
stringent understanding of “shared meaning”? 
2.  “Shared Meaning” as Reasonably Accessible Content and  
Successfully Communicated Force. — Consider a second possibility.  We 
might understand “shared meaning” as extending to cases in which illo-
cutionary force is successfully communicated and content is either suc-
cessfully communicated or is reasonably accessible to both parties.  The 
second understanding of “shared meaning” relies on the notion of “rea-
sonably accessible content.”  The basic idea here is that content can be 
accessible but not yet accessed.  That idea should be uncontroversial.  
In written communication, it is almost always the case that content is 
created before it is actually conveyed.104  A draft contract has content 
before the draft is read by someone other than the drafter. 
Scenario One105 involves content that is reasonably accessible to both 
parties but is not actually communicated.  In Scenario One, the EEI 
Master Contract could be understood by the agents of the parties.  Be-
cause the lawyers for the parties could read and comprehend the content 
of the agreement with the usual amount of effort required, the content 
of the Master Contract is “reasonably accessible” as I am using that 
phrase.  So, if “shared meaning” is understood in this way and if “shared 
meaning” is required for “contract” (as opposed to pseudo-contract), then 
the Master Contract is a true “contract.” 
Scenario Two106 may be different.  If pari passu clauses have a “black 
hole problem,”107 then the content of a contract containing such clauses 
may not be reasonably accessible to either party.  There may be other 
provisions of the contract with successfully communicated content or 
with reasonably accessible content, but the full communicative content 
of the agreement contains a gap.  We might be tempted to say that such 
an agreement is not a true “contract,” but there are other possibilities.  
We might say that the pari passu clause has no legal effect, creating a 
gap that must be filled, either by an off-the-shelf default rule or a  
bespoke provision created by judicial construction. 
3.  Kar and Radin’s Understanding of “Shared Meaning.” — I now 
turn to Kar and Radin’s explication of the idea of “shared meaning.”  
Here is their initial definition of “shared meaning”: 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 104 There are possible situations in which content is conveyed as it is being created.  For example, 
if someone were to be looking over my shoulder as I wrote this Response, content creation and 
conveyance would be simultaneous — as is ordinarily the case in face-to-face oral communication. 
 105 See supra section II.B.1, p. 54. 
 106 See supra section II.B.1, p. 54. 
 107 Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 84, at 3–4. 
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We . . . define the “shared meaning” of a contract as the meaning parties 
produce and agree to during contract formation that is most consistent with 
the presupposition that both were using language cooperatively to form a 
contract.108 
This definition cannot be what Kar and Radin would endorse upon 
reflection.  The definition contains two elements: 
Element One: “[T]he meaning parties produce and agree to during 
contract formation.” 
Element Two: “[T]he meaning . . . that is most consistent with the 
presupposition that both were using language cooperatively to form a 
contract.” 
When both elements are satisfied, this definition is very close to the 
first formulation above — “successfully communicated content and 
force.”  Their definition implicitly assumes that the intended force of the 
communications (for example, offer and acceptance) was to create a con-
tract.  When content is successfully communicated and the parties are 
engaging in cooperative contractual communication, then both  
Elements One and Two are satisfied. 
But Elements One and Two can come apart in a variety of ways.  
Element Two assumes cooperative contractual communication, but con-
tracting parties can engage in strategic communication that nonetheless 
produces shared understandings of communicative content — as illus-
trated in Table 1.109  In such cases, the content that would have been 
produced by cooperative communication may diverge from the content 
that was actually shared.110 
Another source of possible divergence is illustrated by Scenario One, 
in which the parties agree to the EEI Master Contract but do not actu-
ally comprehend its terms.  Are the unnoticed terms part of “the mean-
ing parties produce and agree to during contract formation”?111  Here, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 108 Kar & Radin, supra note 1, at 1143. 
 109 See supra Table 1. 
 110 Elements One and Two might be intended to express necessary and sufficient conditions for 
shared meaning.  That is, for meaning to be shared it must both be produced and agreed to during 
contract formation, and it must also be maximally consistent with the presupposition that both 
parties were using language cooperatively to form a contract.  If this understanding is correct, then 
failure to satisfy either element results in a lack of shared meaning.  For example, a contract that 
violated the maxim of quantity by containing redundant provisions would lack “shared meaning” 
even if both parties understood the redundant provisions.  Similarly, a contract that satisfied all the 
maxims would lack shared meaning if one or more of the parties failed to grasp its content.  In any 
event, this interpretation of the second definition is inconsistent with its actual wording: “We then 
define the ‘shared meaning’ of a contract as the meaning parties produce and agree to during con-
tract formation that is most consistent with the presupposition that both were using language co-
operatively to form a contract.”  Kar & Radin, supra note 1, at 1143 (emphasis added).  The italicized 
portion of the definition is not a conjunction: shared meaning is agreed meaning “that is most con-
sistent” with the specified presupposition.  Id. 
 111 Id. (emphasis added). 
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my reaction is that Kar and Radin’s notion of “produce and agree”112 is 
ambiguous, with at least two possible interpretations. 
Consider the first interpretation of “produce and agree.”  Production 
and agreement might simply mean that the parties somehow produced 
a text and then agreed to be bound by the standard meaning (Gricean 
sentence meaning) of that text.  This first interpretation of their defini-
tion would entail that the terms of the EEI Master Contract are “shared 
meaning” — assuming that the terms of the Master Contract are con-
sistent with cooperative contractual communication.113 
Or they might require that the parties produce and agree to the ac-
tual meaning (communicative content) of the contract.  On this second 
interpretation of “produce and agree,” the EEI Master Contract would 
not satisfy Element One, but it might still satisfy Element Two —  
revealing the potential inconsistency between Element One and Element 
Two.  Kar and Radin use expressions like “a shared meaning to which 
both parties actually agreed.”114  Their use of this expression seems to 
support the second interpretation.  And Kar and Radin seem to  
explicitly reject the first interpretation when they state, “delivery of text 
is not the same thing as successful production of shared meaning for a 
contract.”115 
The second interpretation of “produce and agree” also seems to be 
supported by their analysis of boilerplate terms: “‘terms’ — which now 
include enormous streams of boilerplate text that are delivered but never 
read by anyone — are no longer terms with shared meaning.”116  And 
the second interpretation is also supported by the footnote to their defi-
nition, which reads as follows: 
The common meaning of the parties cannot be discerned if the only factor 
considered is what a sentence would mean to a competent language speaker, 
regardless of whether it was ever cooperatively communicated.  This ap-
proach is sometimes dubbed “objective.”  A contract also cannot be properly 
interpreted based on a deviant interpretation held secretly by one party.  
This approach is sometimes labeled “subjective.”117 
The emphasis in this passage is on what is “communicated,” suggest-
ing that actual communication of content is required by the phrase “the 
meaning parties produce and agree to during contract formation.”118 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 112 Id. 
 113 The first interpretation relies on the distinction between first- and second-order communica-
tive intentions that is discussed below.  See infra section II.D, pp. 66–67.  On the first interpretation, 
it is sufficient for the parties to have a meshing second-order communicative intention — specifi-
cally, the intention to be bound by the standard or ordinary meaning of the words. 
 114 Kar & Radin, supra note 1, at 1139 (emphasis added). 
 115 Id. at 1155. 
 116 Id. at 1140. 
 117 Id. at 1143 n.18. 
 118 Id. at 1143. 
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How could Kar and Radin resolve the tension between Element One 
and Element Two of their proposed definition?  One possibility is that 
“shared meaning” is actually defined by Element Two.  That possibility 
is suggested by a second definition of “shared meaning” offered at a later 
point in their article: “The shared meaning of a contract is the meaning 
that is most consistent with the presupposition that both parties were 
using language cooperatively to form a contract.”119  The second defini-
tion omits Element One. 
At this point, it is important to observe that there is a deep difference 
between the second interpretation of Element One (requiring communi-
cative content that is actually shared) and Element Two as reflected in 
Kar and Radin’s second definition.  Element One limits the terms of a 
contract to those that actually were shared.  Element Two and the sec-
ond definition involve meaning that is potentially counterfactual.  The 
meaning that is most consistent with using language cooperatively may 
or may not be the same as the meaning that was actually shared. 
The key to understanding the second definition is the phrase “most 
consistent with cooperative contractual communication.”  What does 
this mean?  The answer comes in Kar and Radin’s third definition of 
“shared meaning”: 
 The “shared meaning” of a contract can now be defined at a suitable 
level of generality as that meaning that is most consistent with the presup-
position that both parties were using language cooperatively to contract — 
that is, in accordance with the four relevant Maxims of Quantity, Quality, 
Relation, and Manner, and any further specifications of them.  The shared 
meaning of a contract differs from both sentence meaning and any one 
party’s speaker meaning.120 
The third definition cashes out the idea of shared meaning in terms of 
consistency with Grice’s maxims of conversation. 
In some cases, the meaning that is most consistent with the maxims 
will be the communicative content that is actually shared by the parties, 
but in other cases the content that would be most consistent with the 
maxims of conversation will be different from the content that was  
actually shared. 
Let us give a name to Kar and Radin’s third definition, which glosses 
“shared meaning” as the meaning that is most consistent with the  
maxims: 
Maxim Maximizing Meaning is the communicative content that 
would have been produced if the parties to an agreement had  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 119 Id. at 1146. 
 120 Id. at 1154.  The third definition is clearly distinct from the second.  Whereas the second 
definition contains two elements, the third definition (as stated) contains only one.  It is possible 
that the third definition is phrased badly and that Kar and Radin actually intended the third defi-
nition as a gloss on the second element of the second definition.  This possibility leaves the tension 
between the two elements of the second definition without explicit resolution.  See supra note 110. 
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communicative intentions and understandings that were maximally con-
sistent with the maxims of conversation. 
And let us define the contrasting notions of actually shared meaning 
and actual meanings that are not shared. 
Shared Actual Meaning is the communicative content that results if 
communicative intentions are successfully conveyed in contractual com-
munication.  For example, if both the content and force of an offer are 
successfully communicated by an offeror and an offeree successfully 
communicates the content and force of an acceptance, then the commu-
nicative content of the resulting agreement is Shared Actual Meaning. 
Unshared Actual Meanings are the communicative contents that re-
sult if the communicative intentions are misunderstood in contractual 
communications.  For example, if the content of an offer is not success-
fully communicated by an offeror resulting in an offeree grasping con-
tent that is different, then the resulting “contract” has Unshared Actual 
Meaning — as in Raffles v. Wichelhaus.121 
Finally, let us add a definition for meanings that are reasonably ac-
cessible to the parties to an agreement, but are not actually shared: 
Reasonably Accessible Meaning is the communicative content that 
would result if the communicative intentions of the drafters of contrac-
tual language had been successfully conveyed to the contracting parties 
(whether or not the drafter is a party) if and only if these communicative 
intentions were reasonably accessible to the parties in due course. 
With these four stipulated definitions in place, we are now in a po-
sition to undertake a more precise analysis of the conceptual structure 
of Kar and Radin’s shared meaning theory. 
Maxim Maximizing Meaning can be identical to Shared Actual 
Meaning — as in the case of a negotiated oral contract in which the 
behavior of the parties conforms to the maxims of conversation: a suc-
cessfully negotiated oral agreement like the one between Ben and Alice 
discussed above is an example of such identity.122  But this need not be 
the case.  In some cases, the Maxim Maximizing Meaning will be iden-
tical to the Reasonably Accessible Meaning — as may be the case in the 
hypothetical in which parties agree to the EEI Master Contract but are 
unaware of some new terms (and hence lack Shared Actual Meaning).123  
In other cases, the Maxim Maximizing Meaning will be one of the  
Unshared Actual Meanings that arise when contractual communication 
misfires: if the offeror’s communicative intentions are more consistent 
with the maxims than the offeree’s understandings of those intentions, 
then the offeree’s intentions are the Maxim Maximizing Meaning — and 
vice versa if the offeree’s understandings are more consistent with the 
maxims. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 121 (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375; 2 Hurl. & C. 906. 
 122 See supra section II.A.1, p. 47. 
 123 See supra section II.A.2, p. 47. 
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My investigation of Kar and Radin’s idea of “shared meaning”  
suggests that this notion is not a simple one.  Shared Actual Meaning,  
Reasonably Accessible Meaning, and Maxim Maximizing Meaning are 
conceptually distinct and sometimes diverge in application.  The next 
step in my investigation is to examine Kar and Radin’s application of 
the Shared Meaning Analysis to problems of contract law. 
C.  Shared Meaning and Contract Construction 
How does Shared Meaning Analysis play out in contract law?  This 
question marks an important conceptual move from the discussion of 
the nature of “shared meaning.”  When we ask questions about the legal 
effect that courts will give to contractual communications, we turn from 
interpretation (the discovery of communicative content) to construction 
(the determination of legal effect).  Kar and Radin believe that Shared 
Meaning Analysis enables us to differentiate between contract and 
pseudo-contract.124  When courts ask the question, “What are the terms 
of a contract?,” they should limit their answer to those terms which are 
part of the shared meaning of the contract.  How would this work in 
practice?  And how does Shared Meaning Analysis handle divergence 
between Shared Actual Meaning, Reasonably Accessible Meaning, and 
Maxim Maximizing Meaning?  Kar and Radin investigate these ques-
tions in a variety of contexts, but I will limit my discussion to two spe-
cific contexts: boilerplate and fine print. 
1.  Shared Meaning and Boilerplate. — How should the law treat 
boilerplate?  Kar and Radin’s analysis of boilerplate begins with a test 
that requires judges to perform a thought experiment: 
 We suggest that courts imagine that all of the written and digital text 
exchanged during contract formation is converted into oral form and takes 
place in a face-to-face conversation between the relevant parties.  With re-
spect to any disputed boilerplate text, courts can then ask the following 
question: 
  Could this boilerplate text have plausibly contributed to an oral conver-
sation that contributes terms to a contract consistent with the presupposi-
tion that both parties were observing the cooperative norms that govern 
language use to form a contract?125 
The thought experiment involves a counterfactual — an oral con-
versation in which the string of words constituting the boilerplate is read 
out loud.  The thought experiment asks whether the boilerplate would 
have created shared communicative content in an oral exchange. 
Kar and Radin contend that this thought experiment can be used to 
identify “shared meaning,” but when they describe the work they believe 
the test will perform, they shift from the language of counterfactuals to 
the language of actual agreement.  Here is the key passage: 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 124 See Kar & Radin, supra note 1, at 1142–43. 
 125 Id. at 1167. 
  
2019] CONTRACTUAL COMMUNICATION 61 
  The first question that the conceptual test of [S]hared [M]eaning  
[A]nalysis can help courts answer more accurately is whether any disputed 
piece of boilerplate text contributes to an actual agreement between parties.  
Actual agreement is a boundary line.  Without any actual agreement, there 
is no contract; whereas any boilerplate text that falls within the scope of 
parties’ actual agreements adds terms to a contract that are presumptively 
legally enforceable.  Actual agreements also have content, which is identical 
to the common meaning of the parties.  This has implications for the scope 
of parties’ actual agreements and contracts.126 
Given our investigation of the nature of “shared meaning,” there is 
reason to be concerned about the apparent tension between the counter-
factual nature of the thought experiment and the work that it is  
supposed to do — determining “actual agreement” and “the common 
meaning of the parties.” 
We can examine this tension by considering one of their examples 
and contrasting it with the second prototypical situation of contractual 
communication introduced above, the EEI Master Contract.127  Kar and 
Radin discuss similar agreements in the following passage, with an im-
portant sentence highlighted (by me) in italics: 
  How does [S]hared [M]eaning [A]nalysis relate to boilerplate text  
required of members in particular businesses or trade associations?  Many 
of the issues posed by boilerplate that is generated by trade associations are 
not issues of contract scope or interpretation.  For example, the requirement 
of some industry-wide boilerplate terms could be anticompetitive under cer-
tain (perhaps many) circumstances — creating ensconced collusion and 
making new entry into the market difficult or economically impossible (too 
risky, or otherwise too expensive).  Still, the participants in associations like 
these are typically sophisticated parties who understand and even play a 
role in producing changes from time to time to the required boilerplate text.  
Though the linguistic interactions are more complex, it is possible to under-
stand most or all of this boilerplate text as contributing to a longer-term oral 
conversation in which the text is actually conveyed and understood at some 
point by most or all of the relevant sophisticated parties.  So unlike in the 
case of consumer clickwrap purchases, there should be fewer problems with 
this type of high-end boilerplate creating actual agreements with shared 
meanings.  Most disputes should be over how to interpret the shared  
meaning of this boilerplate text in social context, rather than over whether 
the boilerplate text contributes terms to the contracts.128 
The italicized passage is illuminated by recalling the distinctions be-
tween Shared Actual Meaning, Unshared Actual Meaning, Maxim  
Maximizing Meaning, and Reasonably Accessible Meaning as defined 
above.129  Kar and Radin’s counterfactual thought experiment is a ve-
hicle for recovering Maxim Maximizing Meaning, but because it is a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 126 Id. at 1173. 
 127 See supra section II.A.2, pp. 47–48. 
 128 Kar & Radin, supra note 1, at 1189 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  
 129 See supra section II.B.3, pp. 58–59. 
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counterfactual it does not aim to recover Shared Actual Meaning, de-
spite the misleading reference to “the text” being “actually conveyed and 
understood at some point by most or all of the relevant sophisticated 
parties.” 
Consider the implications of Kar and Radin’s thought experiment 
for the hypothetical introduced in the discussion of the second prototyp-
ical situation of contractual communication.130  The EEI Master  
Contract would produce Shared Actual Meaning if it were read and 
understood by agents of the parties, but in the hypothetical, the agents 
of the contracting parties have not read and understood the most recent 
version of the agreement because they assume that it is the same as a 
prior version employed by the parties.  Some of the terms in the EEI 
Master Contract are not “actually conveyed and understood” by either 
of the parties in the hypothetical. 
If we understand Kar and Radin to require actual agreement on 
terms, then some of the provisions of the EEI Master Contract are not 
part of their contract.  If we understand Kar and Radin to allow for 
terms to which there would have been agreement in a counterfactual 
oral exchange, then these provisions are part of the contract.  But they 
cannot have it both ways. 
There is another solution to this problem, which is suggested by the 
idea of Reasonably Accessible Meaning.  We might take the position 
that the terms of the EEI Master Contract govern so long as they are 
either part of its Shared Actual Meaning or its Reasonably Accessible 
Meaning.  That is, we could explicitly acknowledge the distinction be-
tween meaning that is actually shared and meaning that is reasonably 
accessible but not actually shared.  This way of talking has one im-
portant advantage of conceptual clarity: it makes the distinction be-
tween actual sharing and reasonable accessibility clear and transparent. 
Not explicitly acknowledging the distinction between Shared Actual 
Meaning and Reasonably Accessible Meaning has several disad-
vantages.  The question whether a complex form contract would be 
comprehensible in an oral exchange is an empirical one.  The answer 
depends on the findings of cognitive science regarding mental processing 
of information conveyed in oral exchanges.  If those findings reveal that 
some complex written agreements can be understood in written form, 
but that their complexity is such that they cannot be conveyed in an oral 
exchange, Kar and Radin’s test will reject their inclusion in the contract.  
But this result seems arbitrary.  If we are after Shared Actual Meaning, 
communicative content that was accessed by all of the parties to a con-
tract, then the question is whether the provisions of a written contract 
were understood as conveyed in writing.  The fact that the provisions 
would not have been understood if they had been conveyed orally is 
simply not relevant to question whether they were actually shared. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 130 See supra section II.A.2, p. 47. 
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These issues are made more complex by the fact that Kar and  
Radin’s test does not exclude all contractual provisions that did not pro-
duce Shared Actual Meaning.  Without the double negative in the prior 
sentence, the point is that Kar and Radin would give legal effect to un-
shared meanings. 
Provisions that pass the oral exchange test are part of a contract, 
even if they were not actually read and comprehended.  So, the oral 
exchange test seems to allow for provisions that satisfy something that 
resembles the criterion of Reasonably Accessible Meaning.  Perhaps Kar 
and Radin believe that access is reasonable if the terms would have been 
comprehended as part of an oral conversation.  But why is an imaginary 
oral conversation the proper standard for what is reasonably accessible?  
If the parties could have understood the provisions in written form using 
effort that is proportionate to the stakes (for example, the monetary 
value of the agreement), then why should it matter whether the terms 
would have been understood in an oral exchange?  For example, the 
EEI Master Contract might be comprehensible to lawyers who spend a 
reasonable amount of time studying its provisions in written form; this 
might involve rereading complex sentences and tracing the interaction 
between various provisions.  Why should it matter if the provisions 
could not be understood in an oral conversation?  So far as I can tell, 
Kar and Radin do not provide a normative defense of their oral  
conversation test. 
2.  Shared Meaning and Fine Print. — How should contract law 
treat fine print?  Kar and Radin discuss this problem131 in the context 
of Izadi v. Machado (Gus) Ford, Inc.132  For my purposes the key fact 
of the Izadi case is that an offer in a newspaper to provide a $3000 trade-
in value on any car was limited in “infinitesimally small print” to the 
purchase of two particular cars, neither of which was pictured in the 
advertisement.133  When Izadi attempted to purchase one of the cars 
that was pictured (a 1988 Ford Ranger Pick-Up), he was informed of 
the fine print.134 
Kar and Radin apply their imaginary oral contract test as follows: 
  Use of the conceptual test of [S]hared [M]eaning [A]nalysis suggests that 
oral communication of the ad would have conversationally implied —  
without literally saying — that the $3,000 minimum trade-in allowance ap-
plied to the purchase of a 1988 Ford Ranger Pick-Up.  When the car deal-
ership tried to add an additional limitation, through “infinitesimally small 
print,” one would have to imagine that an agent for the dealership proposed 
this additional limitation only inaudibly, under his breath.  This proposed 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 131 Kar & Radin, supra note 1, at 1192–95. 
 132 550 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). 
 133 Kar & Radin, supra note 1, at 1193–94 (citing Izadi, 550 So. 2d at 1138). 
 134 Id. 
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limitation was not communicated clearly enough to comply with the Maxim 
of Manner — which says to communicate clearly.  It therefore failed to 
contribute any proposed terms that were ever under discussion or actually 
agreed to when the parties formed their contract.135 
This analysis is insightful, but it raises several questions.  First, when 
the written offer is transposed into an oral conversation, Kar and Radin 
stipulate that the additional limitations were proposed “inaudibly” un-
der the breath of the agent for the dealership.  But this stipulation seems 
contrary to the general design of the thought experiment.  Consider how 
this move might be transposed into another context, clickwrap agree-
ments.  We could just as easily imagine that clickwrap terms are deliv-
ered from a great distance so that they cannot be heard.  If the fine print 
is truly incomprehensible because the print is so fine as to be unreadable 
(truly inaccessible or figuratively infinitesimal), then it is not part of the 
writing and we don’t need the thought experiment to show this.  If the 
fine print is legible, then it seems inappropriate to make it inaudible in 
the thought experiment.  The more natural translation would be an oral 
communication that is delivered at a low volume that requires focused 
attention.  The more general point is that the outcome of the thought 
experiment hinges on seemingly arbitrary decisions about how to trans-
late the actual written communication into a hypothetical oral exchange. 
In Izadi (or a hypothetical variation of its facts), the terms in fine 
print were not part of the Shared Actual Meaning of the offer, because 
the offeree, Izadi, did not read them.  Were these terms nonetheless part 
of the Reasonably Accessible Meaning?  The question is not whether it 
would have been possible for the offeree to access the term limiting the 
offer: presumably it was possible, although it might have required a 
magnifying glass.  Rather, the question is whether the fine print was 
reasonably accessible: Could it have been understood by an ordinary 
person making an effort that is reasonable under the circumstances? 
Perhaps, the problem is not that the consumer could not have read 
the fine print, but that we believe that it is unreasonable to require con-
sumers to do this.  Defining the standard for reasonable accessibility is 
beyond the scope of this Response, but it seems likely that a defensible 
conception of reasonable accessibility would result in the conclusion that 
the fine print limitation was not part of the reasonably accessible content 
of the agreement.  For example, if the print was so fine that it could only 
be read by use of a magnifying glass, then we might conclude that it 
was not reasonably accessible. 
But there is another aspect of Izadi that seems more fundamental.  
The advertisement appears to have been designed to be deliberately mis-
leading.  Even if a wary consumer could reasonably have accessed the 
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fine print, the combination of the large print offer of a $3000 trade-in 
on any vehicle with pictures of vehicles that were excluded by the fine 
print136 supports the inference that the advertisement was intended to 
deceive consumers, luring customers into the dealership by creating the 
impression that they could get a $3000 trade-in on their $500 junker for 
the purchase of a desirable and reasonably priced Ford Ranger.  This 
would be a classic “bait and switch.”137 
The discussion of strategic and cooperative contractual communica-
tion above demonstrated the conceptual independence of the distinction 
between strategic and cooperative communication, on the one hand, and 
shared and unshared meaning on the other.138  Suppose that Izadi had 
actually read the fine print with the aid of a magnifying glass and un-
derstood the exclusion.  The term would then have been part of the 
Shared Actual Meaning of the offer, but the offer would nonetheless 
have been a strategic contractual communication that aimed at decep-
tion but failed.  The question whether we should nonetheless allow Izadi 
to enforce the offer as he would have understood it if he had been de-
ceived is an interesting one, but the notion of shared meaning that is in-
fact shared would not urge an affirmative answer. 
There is another dimension of the Izadi case illuminated by the  
Gricean idea of speaker’s meaning — the meaning the speaker or author 
intends the listener to grasp via the listener’s or reader’s recognition of 
the speaker’s communicative intentions.  In the Izadi case, it seems  
plausible that the dealership intended to communicate different mes-
sages to different readers and to the same readers on different occasions.  
Customers were intended to recognize one communicative intention at 
the time they initially read the advertisement (no limitation to the two 
particular models) and another communicative intention when the fine 
print was drawn to their attention when they proffered a trade-in on a 
model outside the limitation.  This second communicative intention pro-
vided the meaning that the dealership hoped to convey to courts, if a 
consumer tried to hold the dealership to its offer.  In other words, the 
dealership was speaking out of both sides of its mouth. 
Under these circumstances, we might say that the limitation to two 
particular models was not part of the offer to Izadi.  Izadi correctly 
grasped the dealership’s communicative intentions directed to consum-
ers: if Izadi then accepted the offer, Shared Actual Meaning would have 
been created.  This can be true, even though the advertisement  
embodied multiple and inconsistent communicative intentions.  The 
communicative intention conveyed to Izadi at the time he read the ad-
vertisement differed from the intention conveyed when the fine print 
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 136 Izadi, 550 So. 2d at 1137. 
 137 See David Adam Friedman, Explaining “Bait-and-Switch” Regulation, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. 
L. REV. 575, 580–81 (2013) (defining “bait and switch”). 
 138 See supra section I.B.3(c), p. 43. 
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was pointed out.  The text was the same; the communicative intentions 
conveyed by the text in distinct contexts were different.  This feature of 
the Izadi case shows the importance of clearly distinguishing the seman-
tics and pragmatics of contractual communication: the same text (the 
advertisement) produces different communicative content when read in 
different contexts. 
In sum, I would like to suggest that cases like Izadi are more complex 
than Kar and Radin’s analysis would suggest.  Moreover, it is not clear 
that either Grice’s maxims of conversation or the imaginary oral con-
versation thought experiment provides the most perspicuous analysis of 
cases involving strategic contractual communication.  Even if we agree 
with Kar and Radin that Izadi should prevail, our reasons may differ 
from theirs. 
D.  First- and Second-Order Communicative Intentions 
At this point, we can step back and examine an issue that has been 
lurking in the background so far.  In the discussion of the “black hole 
problem” associated with pari passu clauses, I introduced the idea of 
“first-order” and “second-order” communicative intentions.139  This idea 
is well articulated by Professor Michael Moore: “An interpretive intent 
is a second-order intention about how one’s first order intentions are to 
be used in interpreting what one has said.”140 
Let us now stipulate the following definitions: 
First-Order Communicative Intention: A first-order communicative 
intention is an intention to convey particular content via an utterance 
or writing.  Example: Harry utters “Simon is beautiful” with the first-
order communicative intention to convey the proposition Simon Wong 
is a physically beautiful man. 
Second-Order Communicative Intention: A second-order communi-
cative intention is an intention regarding first-order communicative in-
tentions.  Example: James Madison writes the text of the First  
Amendment to the Constitution with the second-order intention that the 
communicative content conveyed by the text be the public meaning of 
the text. 
Second-order communicative intentions play an important role in le-
gal communication.  Thus, the drafters of the constitutional text might 
have had a second-order communicative intention that the text be un-
derstood to have the content conveyed by its public meaning and that 
in cases of divergence between public meaning and their private first-
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 139 See supra section II.A.3, pp. 48–51. 
 140 Michael S. Moore, Justifying the Natural Law Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2087, 2096 (2001); see also Adrian Vermeule, Judicial History, 108 YALE L.J. 
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lawmakers’ substantive intention to enact rules with certain content, but also by their second- 
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order communicative intentions, the public meaning should prevail.  
Likewise, the drafters of a statute may have a second-order communi-
cative intention that the text of the statute be understood to have its 
plain meaning, even if that meaning differs from the drafters own first-
order communicative intentions. 
The distinction between first- and second-order communicative  
intentions operates in the context of contractual communication.  For 
example, the parties to the EEI Master Contract might intend that the 
agreement have the communicative content intended by the Drafting 
Committee, even if that content differs from the content assumed by one 
or even all of the parties to a contract modeled on the Master Contract.  
In this case, the second-order communicative intentions of the parties 
would point to Reasonably Accessible Meaning as the intended mean-
ing.  All would be well if the parties’ first-order communicative inten-
tions mesh with their second-order communicative intentions, but in 
cases of divergence the law will have to choose.  Moreover, the parties 
might actually express a second-order communicative intention in the 
agreement itself.  For example, the EEI Master Contract might have 
included an “interpretation clause”141 specifying that in the case of dis-
agreement over the meaning of the text the communicative intentions of 
the drafters would govern. 
So far as I can tell, Kar and Radin elide the questions raised by “in-
terpretive intent” or “second-order communicative intentions,” but 
Shared Meaning Analysis seems to take a stand on the second-order 
question as to which communicative intentions should govern.  Or per-
haps Kar and Radin take more than one stand, shifting from meaning 
that was actually shared to the meaning that would have been shared if 
the parties had communicated in the way that would have been most 
consistent with the maxims.  In either case, it is at least possible that the 
second-order communicative intentions of the parties to a contract 
would conflict with Shared Meaning Analysis.  I am not sure how Kar 
and Radin would deal with such cases, but I would like to know. 
E.  The Implications of Shared Meaning Analysis  
for the Interpretation of Contractual Communication 
We are now in a position to appreciate the relationship between the 
general account of legal communication that was developed in Part I 
and Kar and Radin’s shared meaning account of contractual communi-
cation.  That relationship is complex.  On the one hand, we need to 
consider Kar and Radin’s three distinct definitions of shared meaning.142  
On the other hand, we need to account for several features of legal  
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 141 See Uri Benoliel, The Interpretation of Commercial Contracts: An Empirical Study, 69 ALA. 
L. REV. 469, 480 (2017) (discussing “merger clauses” as a type of “interpretation clause”).  
 142 See supra section II.B.3, pp. 56–58.  I now turn to Kar and Radin’s explication of the idea of 
“shared meaning.” 
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communication, including (1) the distinction between speaker’s meaning 
and sentence meaning, (2) the semantic and pragmatic mechanisms by 
which communicative content is conveyed, (3) the limited role of the 
maxims as rules of thumb, (4) the distinction between first-order and 
second-order communicative intentions, and (5) the distinction between 
cooperative and strategic legal communication.  And we must bear in 
mind the interpretation-construction distinction which highlights the 
difference between the meaning of contractual provisions and their legal 
effect. 
On the surface, Kar and Radin’s approach seems to offer a simple 
and powerful theory of contract interpretation.  Readers might believe 
that the application of Shared Meaning Analysis enables us to identify 
the “true meaning” of a written contract.  We run the written contract 
through the oral-conversation thought experiment, which then enables 
us to identify the Maxim Maximizing Meaning (the meaning that is most 
consistent with the Gricean maxims of conversation).  But appearances 
are deceiving.  Application of Kar and Radin’s framework can result in 
content that is different from both the actually shared meaning of the 
parties and the meaning that was not actually shared by them but was 
reasonably accessible to them. 
Consider the following examples of divergence: 
Cases in which the parties recognize noncooperative (strategic) com-
munication but nonetheless have shared understandings.  Example: 
Party A understands that Party B is trying to pull a fast one, but  
nonetheless agrees because the strategically motivated language is actu-
ally in Party A’s interests. 
Cases in which the parties hold shared second-order communicative 
intentions but divergent first-order communicative contentions.   
Example: Parties A and B sign a form contract such as the EEI Master 
Contract with the second-order intention that it be given its drafter’s 
meaning.  However, none of the agents of A and B actually read and 
comprehended some of its provisions, even though the agents of either 
A or B would have understood all of the provisions if they had read 
them with the degree of effort that is reasonable under the  
circumstances. 
Cases in which the written agreement is comprehensible to the par-
ties, but the hypothetical oral conversation would not result in shared 
meaning.  Example: The written contract is long and as a result there 
were pragmatic enrichments (such as implicitures and presuppositions) 
that would be cognitively accessible to a careful reader (such as a lawyer 
doing due diligence) but would not be accessible in an oral conversation. 
These examples bring out the reasons for rejecting the idea that 
Shared Meaning Analysis provides a reliable method of contract  
interpretation that yields the true meaning that a written contract had 
for the parties.  A more accurate way of characterizing Shared Meaning 
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Analysis is that it is a method of contract construction that yields legally 
enforceable contract provisions that may differ in systematic ways from 
the meanings upon which the relevant first- and/or second-order  
communicative intentions of the parties converged. 
III.  METALINGUISTIC CONTESTATION: 
 “CONTRACT” AND “PSEUDO-CONTRACT” 
One more topic before I close.  Kar and Radin distinguish between 
“contract” and “pseudo-contract.”  As they understand it, “the distinction 
between shared meaning (contract) and meaning that is not shared 
(pseudo-contract)” marks the difference between two fundamentally  
different categories.143  They argue that scholars and courts have failed 
to appreciate the significance of this basic conceptual distinction because 
of what they call a “paradigm slip”: 
  We will describe the result of this process as an unconscious or undiag-
nosed “paradigm slip.”  In an unconscious paradigm slip, each small step in 
application aims to preserve the purposes, basic concepts, and coherence of 
a body of doctrine, but the overall result is a largely unintended and more 
fundamental change in the meanings and functions of its core concepts.  As 
a result of a largely unconscious paradigm slip in contract law, many courts 
and scholars now assume that all boilerplate text contributes “terms” to a 
“contract” in largely unproblematic ways akin to the simpler uses of  
language to form contracts in 1883.  They assume that pseudo-contractual 
text should be enforced as “contract” with minimal requirements of “assent,” 
unless there is some standard contract law obstacle to enforcement arising 
from something like illegality or unconscionability.  This is to treat pseudo-
contract as contract without adequate reflection.  A major noncontractual 
intrusion into the traditional sphere of contract law and modern market 
activity has gone largely unrecognized; or, at least, the full depths and prob-
lematic nature of the intervention have escaped widespread notice.144 
Thus, Kar and Radin would restrict the proper use of the word  
“contract” and associated terms like “contractual” and “contracting” to 
agreements reached on the basis of shared meaning.145  Without shared 
meaning there is no contract, although there might be a pseudo- 
contract.146  The terms of contracts are determined by shared meaning, 
although other terms might create additional pseudo-contractual  
obligations.147 
What kind of move are Kar and Radin making?  Why do they be-
lieve that the distinction between “contract” and “pseudo-contract” is 
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 143 Kar & Radin, supra note 1, at 1166. 
 144 Id. at 1142 (footnote omitted).  
 145 See id. at 1140, 1214. 
 146 Id. at 1155. 
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important?  Why should we resist the “paradigm slip”?  One important 
angle on these questions is provided by the distinction between “words” 
and concepts.148  “Contract” is a word, as are associated words and 
phrases like “contractual assent” or “contract terms.”  The word “con-
tract” has an ordinary meaning in American English, and it may well 
have a more specialized and nuanced meaning in the linguistic subcom-
munity of lawyers and judges.  But the word “contract” represents a 
concept that could be expressed in other words.  For example, the  
English word “contract” is translated as “Contrat” in French,149  
“Vertrag” in German,150 and “mkataba” in Swahili.151  The word “con-
tract” is used to convey the concept contract. 
It might seem that Kar and Radin are merely quibbling about defi-
nitions, but I do not believe that the real thrust of their argument is 
about the meaning of the word “contract.”  If that were their concern, 
then we should be able to test their claim against the linguistic evidence.  
The conventional semantic meaning of the word “contract” is a function 
of patterns of usage,152 but Kar and Radin themselves observe that par-
adigm slip has resulted from the extension of the word “contract” to 
agreements without shared meaning, which they call “pseudo- 
contracts.”153  In other words, current usage (after the paradigm slip) 
disfavors their proposed definition.  For this reason, I think that the 
heart of Kar and Radin’s claim is conceptual rather than terminological. 
Kar and Radin believe that the concept of contract is being misused, 
but it is unclear why.  They might believe that contract has an essence.154  
Natural kind terms like “gold” represent concepts that have an essence 
provided by natural science: for something to be gold, it must have the 
atomic structure of gold.155  Moore has argued that concepts employed 
by the law, which he calls “functional kinds,” and might also be called 
“moral kinds,” have essences which can be investigated by legal  
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 148 See supra section I.B.3(a), pp. 40–42. 
 149 French Translation of “Contract,” COLLINS, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/ 
dictionary/english-french/contract [https://perma.cc/T4YR-NBC5]. 
 150 German Translation of “Contract,” COLLINS, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/ 
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 153 See Kar & Radin, supra note 1, at 1140. 
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AND NECESSITY (1980); 2 HILARY PUTNAM, The Meaning of “Meaning,” in MIND, LANGUAGE 
AND REALITY 215 (1975). 
 155 See PUTNAM, supra note 154, at 223–29. 
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theory.156  Perhaps, Kar and Radin believe that contract is a functional 
kind with an essence, although I was unable to find any evidence of 
such a belief in Pseudo-Contract and Shared Meaning Analysis.157 
Or perhaps they see the problem through the lens of the concept-
conception distinction, famously deployed by John Rawls,158 who drew 
on Essentially Contested Concepts, by the philosopher William Gallie.159  
Rawls argued that “justice” is a contested concept; he offered his theory, 
which he called “justice as fairness,” as a conception of justice that com-
petes with rival conceptions such as utilitarianism.160  Kar and Radin 
might believe that contract is a contested concept and that Shared 
Meaning Analysis offers the best conception of that concept.  They 
might then employ the method of reflective equilibrium to demonstrate 
that Shared Meaning Analysis best accounts for our considered judg-
ments about contract law.  So far as I can tell, Kar and Radin do not 
pursue this strategy in Pseudo-Contract and Shared Meaning  
Analysis.161 
Related to the notion that there can be different conceptions of  
contested concepts is the idea of metalinguistic negotiation.162  A  
metalinguistic negotiation involves a dispute over a word or phrase and 
its associated concept.  One way to move forward in the process of  
metalinguistic negotiation is to agree on standards of conceptual ethics.  
For example, we might argue that in the context of legal theory, the 
concept of contract ought to be sufficiently broad to account for disa-
greements among contract theorists about the best normative account 
of contract law.  It might be argued that an attempt to tie the concept 
of contract to a particular normative theory involves an illicit attempt 
to leverage a metalinguistic proposal into a substantive victory in the 
normative debate.  If Kar and Radin were attempting to make this 
move, it might be suggested that the attempt to relegate other normative 
theories of contract to the realm of pseudo-contract fails to preserve the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 156 See Michael S. Moore, Law as a Functional Kind, in NATURAL LAW THEORY 188, 213–
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conceptual structure of theoretical debates about the nature and proper 
function of contract law. 
I am not sure about the deep foundations of Kar and Radin’s argu-
ment that contract should be limited to agreements with shared meaning 
in their sense and that the rest of what is now called “contract law” 
should be moved to their newly proposed category of “pseudo-contract.”  
I confess that I am worried about this move.  I am worried because of 
substantive concerns about Kar and Radin’s theory of shared meaning.  
At this point, their theory is innovative, provocative, and challenging, 
but I am not sure that it is fully baked.  My tentative opinion is that 
their account of shared meaning faces serious challenges on several 
fronts, including the problem of reconciling what seems to be an empha-
sis on actually shared communicative content with ideas about counter-
factual meanings related to Grice’s maxims of conversation.  If the best 
theory of contractual communication incorporates ideas about reasona-
bly accessible communicative content and the distinction between first-
order and second-order communicative intentions, then it would be a 
mistake to bake Kar and Radin’s theory of shared meaning into the 
concept of contract itself.  These considerations push me in the direction 
of a more capacious account of the concept of contract, one that allows 
for a greater diversity of views about the best normative theory of  
contract law. 
At this point, some readers may be impatient with the emphasis on 
metalinguistic and conceptual issues.  Readers with a realist bent might 
make the following point: 
I don’t give a hoot whether boilerplate agreements are called  
“contracts” or “pseudo-contracts.”  You can call them “schmomtracts”163 
for all I care.  Conceptual niceties may have their place, but the truly 
important question is whether these agreements are enforceable or not.  
Tell me what practical difference it makes, and then I can tell you 
whether or not I buy the argument. 
A full reply to this point would require an extended discussion of the 
value of conceptual clarity and the development of a normative theory 
of contract law: neither task can be undertaken in this Response.  It is 
not clear that the acceptance of Kar and Radin’s argument would result 
in judicial determination that some boilerplate agreements are unen-
forceable: the result could be the development of a distinct body of 
pseudo-contract doctrine.  So far as I can tell, Kar and Radin do not 
advance the claim that all pseudo-contracts should be legally unenforce-
able, nor do they provide a test for those pseudo-contracts that should 
be enforced and those that should not. 
Although I cannot make the argument on this occasion, I should 
think that it is clear that at least some agreements with Unshared Actual 
Meanings that are reasonably accessible to the parties should be legally 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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enforceable.  For example, in Scenario One, the meaning of the EEI 
Master Contract is reasonably accessible to the parties even though the 
meaning was not actually shared at the time of contract formation.164  
But it seems obvious that invalidation of a contract modeled on the 
Master Contract would upset the expectations of the parties.  In complex 
transactions like those covered by the Master Contract, requiring all the 
parties to actually understand all the provisions might well be very 
costly.  Requiring parties to negotiate a bespoke alternative to the  
Master Contract for each and every wholesale electricity-supply trans-
action would seem to impose obvious and unnecessary costs.  Of course, 
these common-sense observations fall far short of a rigorous argument, 
but they suggest that the notion of Reasonably Accessible Meanings may 
do important normative work that cannot be done by Shared Meaning 
Analysis alone. 
CONCLUSION 
Let me end where I started, with high praise for Pseudo-Contract 
and Shared Meaning Analysis.  Although Kar and Radin’s article has 
prompted me to ask a variety of questions and to raise a series of objec-
tions, I believe that this is testimony to the importance of their project.  
Like Kar and Radin, I believe that attention to the philosophy of lan-
guage and theoretical linguistics is crucially important to progress in 
legal theory generally and to disputes about interpretation and construc-
tion of constitutions, statutes, rules, regulations, and contracts — to start 
a list that undoubtedly is much longer.  Like Kar and Radin, I believe 
that Paul Grice’s theory of meaning is an important starting point, and 
like them, I believe that Grice’s maxims teach important lessons about 
the ways in which legal communication works. 
Unlike Kar and Radin, I am not convinced that Grice’s maxims of 
communication provide the magic key that will unlock the door to the 
true meanings of legal communications.  The maxims are rules of thumb 
that frequently enable us to communicate more efficiently and effec-
tively, but rules of thumb are not (and should not become) rules of law.  
The maxims are part of the story but only a part.  The full story must 
include an account of semantic and pragmatic mechanisms, the  
distinction between first- and second-order communicative intentions, 
the idea of Reasonably Accessible Meaning, and much else. 
But even if Kar and Radin have overestimated the role of the max-
ims in answering questions about the meaning of contractual communi-
cations, Pseudo-Contract and Shared Meaning Analysis is an important 
landmark in the application of ideas from the philosophy of language 
and theoretical linguistics to contract theory.  Pathbreaking scholarship 
frequently raises more questions than it answers and starts more debates 
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than it finishes.  Kar and Radin are raising the truly important ques-
tions, and their work seems likely to start a whole series of debates about 
the nature of contractual communication. 
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